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Abstract 
We examine the announcement returns for Norwegian acquirers of foreign and domestic 
targets between 1988 and 2014. This is done using panel data in a random effects model with 
stock return data from NHH’s Børsprosjektet, and transaction data from SDC’s mergers and 
acquisitions database. We are the first, to our knowledge, to use panel data regression analysis 
on bidder announcement returns. 
Analysing periods around acquisition announcements reveal that only the day of 
announcement yields significant abnormal returns, which is consistent with the efficient 
market hypothesis in semi-strong form. Furthermore, we find no significant abnormal returns 
for firms acquiring public targets, which supports the theory of an efficient market for 
corporate control. However, we find significant abnormal returns for firms acquiring private 
targets. The returns from acquiring private targets are greatest when stock is used as the 
method of payment, while using stock to acquire public targets yields the most negative 
returns. The acquirer’s acquisition experience, the absolute size of the acquirer, and the target 
being in a related industry all have negative effects on announcement returns. Furthermore, 
we model the effect of relative size on announcement returns as a cubic function. This reveals 
a negative relationship until the target is one fourth of the acquirer’s size, and a positive 
relationship beyond this point. Additionally, we are, to our knowledge, the first to account for 
the possibility of altered marked beta coefficients as a result of acquisitions, through the use 
of a step-beta approach. 
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1. Introduction 
«The proposition that a competitive market for corporate control effectively limits managerial 
divergence from shareholder wealth maximization implies that corporate takeovers are 
beneficial to shareholders of both firms involved in the transaction» - Eckbo and Thorburn, 
2000 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) can be considered a quest to find a more effective 
combination of resources in order to create value for shareholders. There is overwhelming 
evidence that, on average, targets receive substantial abnormal returns from being acquired. 
For instance, Kengelbach and Roos (2011) found that the average takeover premium from 
1990 to 2010 was 36%. However, there is counter evidence on abnormal returns for acquirers, 
so returns seem to greatly depend on various deal- and company characteristics. This is 
supported by results found by Bradley and Sundaram (2006), who summarize the bidder 
announcement returns for each year from 1990 to 2000.  
Furthermore, Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) studied the announcement returns for 
companies that have made five or more acquisitions within three years; their sample consists 
of 3,135 transactions. They found an Average Cumulative Abnormal Return (ACAR) [-2, 2] 
(i.e. using a five day window that starts at -2 days and ends at 2 days relative to the 
acquisition announcement) of 1.8%. Stratifying this sample showed that the ACAR was -1% 
Table 1. Announcement Period Abnormal Returns by year, 1990-2000 
Year       All Targets      Public Targets        Private Targets           Difference 
1990 1.17% (2.58)***  0.18%  (0.16) 1.35% (2.65)*** 1.17%     (1.02) 
1991 1.40% (3.08)*** -1.12% (-1.33) 2.01% (2.76)*** 3.13% (2.76)*** 
1992 1.73% (5.12)*** -0.60% (-0.96) 2.20% (5.76)*** 2.80% (3.11)*** 
1993 1.25% (4.41)*** -1.50% (-2.94)*** 1.77% (5.56)*** 3.26% (4.22)*** 
1994 1.32% (5.34)*** -0.03% (-0.03) 1.61% (7.83)*** 1.58% (2.50)*** 
1995 1.25% (5.04)*** -1.30% (-3.42)*** 1.97% (6.67)*** 3.28% (5.51)*** 
1996 1.85% (8.69)*** -0.05% (-0.12) 2.28% (9.33)*** 2.33% (4.31)*** 
1997 1.54% (8.84)*** -0.50% (-1.31) 1.94% (10.05)*** 2.44% (5.26)*** 
1998 1.05% (5.08)*** -0.90% (-1.90)** 1.47% (6.44)*** 2.36% (4.40)*** 
1999 1.63% (5.17)*** -1.20% (-2.11)*** 2.38% (6.56)*** 3.61% (4.71)*** 
2000 2.72% (3.01)*** -0.60% (-0.36) 3.32% (3.25)*** 3.91%      (1.56) 
All 1.45% (17.27)*** -0.71% (-3.89)*** 1.95% (20.66)*** 2.66% (12.31)*** 
 
Source: Bradley and Sundaram (2006) [t-stats in parenthesis] 
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when the target was public, 2.1% when the target was private, and 2.8% when the target was a 
subsidiary. All results were significant at the 10% level. 
Moreover, Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2007) analysed returns from a sample of 4,322 
acquisitions that occurred between 1980 and 2002. They found an ACAR [-1, 1] of 0.8% for 
their sample. However, stratifying their sample revealed that the ACAR was -2.3% for public 
targets that were acquired with stock, 0.7% for public targets that were acquired with cash, 
and 3.4% for private targets that were acquired with stock. Unfortunately, they did not show 
the ACAR of private targets that were acquired with cash. 
These results indicate that negative- or insignificantly different from zero bidder 
announcement returns mostly come from the acquisition of public targets. This is supported 
by research conducted by Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001), which shows the bidder 
announcement returns for the acquisition of public companies by decade from 1973 to 1998. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are several explanations for negative bidder announcement returns. Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) summarize the different explanations. Roll (1986) 
hypothesizes that managers might overpay for targets due to hubris. The manager may believe 
that he is more able to realize synergies than others, or believe he is more capable than others 
of accurately valuing the target. Travlos (1987) finds that acquiring firms with poor returns 
generally pay with equity, and Myers and Majluf (1984) show that firms who issue equity are 
Table 2. Announcement Period Abnormal Returns 1973-1998 
  
1973-79 
 
1980-89 
 
1990-98 
 
1973-98 
Combined:                 
[-1, +1] 
 
1.50% 
 
2.6%* 
 
1.4%* 
 
1.8%* 
[-20, Close] 0.1% 
 
3.2% 
 
1.6% 
 
1.9% 
         Target: 
        [-1, +1] 
 
16%* 
 
16%* 
 
15.9%* 
 
16%* 
[-20, Close] 24.8%* 
 
23.9%* 
 
23.3%* 
 
23.8%* 
         Acquirer: 
        [-1, +1] 
 
-0.30% 
 
-0.40% 
 
-1.00% 
 
-0.70% 
[-20, Close] -4.50% 
 
-3.10% 
 
-3.90% 
 
-3.80% 
         No. Obs. 
 
598 
 
1226 
 
1864 
 
3688 
 
Source: Andrade et al. 2001, * Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 
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usually signalling to the market that they are overvalued. This is supported by Dong, 
Hirshleifer, Richardson and Teoh (2008), who show that acquirers with higher valuations 
receive lower announcement returns. Dong et al. (2008) argue that the market interprets these 
acquirers as using their overvalued equity to pay for, relatively, less overvalued targets. 
Furthermore, McCardle and Viswanathan (1994) and Jovanovic and Braguinsky (2004) find 
that companies usually announce acquisitions when they have exhausted their opportunities 
for organic growth. This indicates that the market will react negatively to the announcement 
of an acquisition if they originally thought the company had numerous opportunities for 
organic growth. Jensen (1986) argues that some managers would rather increase the size of 
their company than pay out free cash flows as dividends to the company’s shareholders. 
Finally, Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford (2004) show that there is downward price pressure on 
the acquirer’s stock after they announce an acquisition paid with stock, partly due to the 
activities of arbitrageurs. 
 
We have decided to focus our research on the acquiring company’s announcement returns 
instead of the announcement returns for the target company. This is because the nature of 
announcement returns – and drivers for these returns - are more opaque for acquirers than for 
the targets. Furthermore, the results found in contemporary research on acquirers are also 
more ambiguous than results found in research on the announcement returns for targets. This 
makes returns to acquirers a more interesting and worthwhile research subject. Moreover, the 
majority of similar research focuses on U.S. acquirers and targets, while the research on 
Norwegian transactions is lacking. There is some research on bidder announcement returns 
for Norwegian acquirers of Norwegian targets, but, to our knowledge, no research on the 
bidder announcement returns for Norwegian acquirers of both Norwegian and foreign targets. 
We have chosen the Norwegian market in order to further expand the field of research and to 
investigate whether there exist any idiosyncratic effects for Norwegian acquirers. In 
particular, we investigate the abnormal returns for Norwegian acquirers in periods where they 
have announced a takeover of a foreign or domestic company, and attempt to uncover the 
major drivers for these returns. 
Our initial sample selection process resulted in 1,677 transactions. These transactions were 
conducted by 383 unique acquirers between 1984 and 2015. We also collected numerous 
deal- and company characteristics that we used to find an explanation for any abnormal 
returns to Norwegian acquirers.  
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The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: 
Section two begins with an overview of previous research. This section is structured to briefly 
explain their sample selection, methodology, results, and inferences. 
Section three contains the hypotheses that this thesis seeks to answer.  
Section four and five continues with a thorough explanation of our own sample selection 
data. This includes how and where we acquired our data, and how we modified it in order to 
conduct our analysis. 
Section five describes the deal- and firm-specific variables we use in our analysis. 
Section six explains our chosen methodology, focusing on how we calculated the abnormal 
announcement returns, why we used panel data and a random effects model to analyse the 
abnormal announcement returns, what econometric issues we encountered in our analysis, and 
what we did in order to rectify these. 
Section seven details our analysis, divided into several sub-sections showing regression 
output with subsequent qualitative interpretation of the implications of our results. First, we 
report our regression output of abnormal announcement returns across different dates relative 
to day zero. Next, we analyse abnormal returns in relation to several control variables. 
The analysis includes: 
 Whether the target being foreign or domestic influences bidder returns. 
 Whether industry has any effect on returns, this is done in two forms: (1) whether any 
industries receive abnormal returns, and (2) whether the fact that the target and 
acquirer are in the same industry affects bidder returns.  
 Whether size has any effect on returns, this is done in two forms: (1) whether the size 
of the target relative to the acquirer influences bidder returns, and (2) whether the 
absolute size of the acquirer influences bidder returns. 
 Whether the acquirer’s method of payment affects bidder returns, where the method of 
payment is stratified into three categories: cash, stock, and hybrid. 
 Whether the effects of size and method of payment on bidder returns are dependent on 
the target being public or private. 
 Whether the fact that a bidder has conducted many prior acquisitions affect their 
announcement returns. 
 Whether returns are affected by the acquiring firm receiving a controlling interest. 
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We also split the sample into public and private targets, and analyse abnormal returns with 
respect to the control variables mentioned. The choice of explanatory variables are based on 
variables used in previous research. See section two for details on the previous research that 
has informed this thesis. 
Section eight explains general robustness issues and how we treat them. 
Section nine concludes the thesis with a summary of our main findings and some suggestions 
for further research. 
There are two important caveats for these kinds of analyses. First, analyses of announcement 
returns usually yield attenuated results due to partial anticipation of the acquisitions. Second, 
the bidder returns at an acquisition announcement date can also be attributable to how the 
market reassesses the bidders business strategy, not only how the market values the 
incremental gain of the acquisition itself (Grinblatt & Titman, 2002). We address this by 
analysing whether there exist any idiosyncrasies for companies that conduct frequent 
acquisitions. One can argue that the market already takes into account these companies’ 
acquisitive nature so that any abnormal announcement return can be wholly attributed to the 
incremental gain of a successful takeover. 
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2. Previous research 
2.1 Research on foreign vs. domestic bidders. 
Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) conducted research on 1,846 acquisitions of Canadian companies 
by both U.S. and Canadian bidders between 1945 and 1983. They found that domestic bidders 
in Canada earned significantly positive monthly announcement returns. They estimated this 
monthly abnormal announcement return to be 1.13% using a pre-event benchmark, and 1.81% 
using a post-event benchmark. Both of these results are significant at a 1% level. 
Using daily returns yielded a significant two-day return of 0.81%. U.S. bidder announcement 
returns, however, are substantially lower than the average performance of domestic bidders 
and indistinguishable from zero.  
Their paper discusses several explanations for superior domestic bidder performance. The 
first explanation is the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) controls. After 1972, foreign 
bidders were required to seek prior Government approval prior to acquiring Canadian 
companies. Intuitively, this gives an advantage to domestic bidders as they are not required to 
undergo such a process, which can take substantial time and effort to complete. 
However, Eckbo and Thorburn found that Canadian bidders outperformed their U.S. 
counterparts even before this FDI control was put in place. Additionally, the foreign bidders 
that were exempt from the review process did not earn significant abnormal returns.  
Their second explanation is that domestic bidders might be more closely related to the targets 
they are acquiring. Domestic bidders might have superior information about Canadian targets 
in the same industry and might be more able to realize synergies. Eckbo and Thorburn 
compared the announcement returns for related, which was defined as sharing a two-digit 
SIC-code, and unrelated acquisitions. However, they did not find any evidence that supported 
this idea; they found that domestic bidders outperformed their U.S. counterparts in both 
horizontal and conglomerate acquisitions. Consequently, perhaps superior domestic 
performance could simply be attributed to geographical proximity. 
Third, analysing different payment methods (i.e. cash, stock, or hybrid) revealed surprising 
results. Stock- and hybrid offers generate significantly positive average announcement returns 
in Canada. This contrasts with the significantly negative market reaction documented by 
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Travlos (1987) for all-stock mergers in the U.S. They noted that there is substantial evidence 
that the U.S. market is influenced by adverse selection (Eckbo & Masulis, 1992). This tends 
to cause a negative market reaction to equity issues. There is less evidence of this for markets 
outside the U.S. 
Finally, comparing bidder announcement returns for transactions where the relative size of the 
target differed showed that there was a negative relationship between the acquirer’s relative 
size and the significance of the announcement returns. U.S. acquirers were about eight times 
as large as their Canadian counterparts were. This indicates that the announcement returns for 
relatively large bidders suffers from an attenuation bias, which could explain the 
insignificance of the foreign (U.S.) announcement returns. 
2.2 Research on industry relatedness 
The question of whether the merger or the acquisition of horizontally similar companies yield 
higher abnormal returns is the subject of many research papers. Akbulut and Matsusaka 
(2010) investigated the abnormal returns for both related and diversifying mergers and 
acquisitions. They used a sample of 4,764 mergers of U.S. public firms between 1950 and 
2002.  Their definition of a related acquisition was that the target and acquirer had to have at 
least one 4-digit SIC code in common. They measured abnormal returns using the Fama-
French three-factor model against a one-year period ending -64 days relative to the acquisition 
announcement date. Moreover, they used an estimation window of [-1, 1] days relative to the 
acquisition announcement, and checked the robustness of their result with another estimation 
using a [-2, 1] window. They found an ACAR [-1, 1], of -1.3% and -0.6% for related mergers 
and diversifying acquisitions, respectively. Moreover, stratifying these returns based on 
method of payment revealed that the mean return for stock acquisitions were -2.3% for related 
acquisitions and -1.7% for diversifying mergers, while for cash payment the returns were 
0.5% for related acquisitions and 0.7% for diversifying mergers. All of these ACARs were 
significant at the 1% level. They also note that the negative returns associated when stock is 
used as the method of payment cannot be solely attributed to the acquisition itself. Seasoned 
equity offerings usually result in negative stock price reactions of around 3% (Smith, 1986), 
and merger announcement returns are usually around 3% lower for stock-financed bids 
(Andrade et al., 2001). Additionally, bidder announcement returns vary greatly depending on 
the estimation time period. Akbulut and Matsusaka (2010) compiled bidder return estimates 
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for several studies, and concluded that timing seems to account for much of the variation 
within the results. The announcement returns are generally positive during the conglomerate 
merger wave (1966-1969) and negative during both the surrounding years and the most recent 
estimation period. 
Interestingly, one of the studies summarized by Akbulut and Matsusaka (2010), Morck et al. 
(1990), reaches the opposite conclusion on the difference in announcement returns for related 
and unrelated acquisitions. They find a 1.54% and 2.88% announcement return when the 
bidder and target share a 4-digit SIC-code on data from 1975-1979 and 1980-1987, 
respectively. The announcement return for transactions where the bidder and target do not 
share a 4-digit SIC-code are 0.77% and 1.27% for the time periods 1975-1979 and 1980-1987, 
respectively. However, this study used a sample of only 326 acquisitions. This pales in 
comparison to the sample of 4,764 acquisitions used by Akbulut and Matsusaka (2010), so the 
results uncovered in Morck et al. (1990) seems less robust than the results in Akbulut and 
Matsusaka (2010). 
2.3 Research on size 
The absolute- and relative size of target and acquirer has been used as an explanatory variable 
in many papers that conduct research on announcement returns. Moeller et al. (2004)’s main 
focus is these size effects on acquirer’s returns. They analysed the acquirer’s return for 
mergers and acquisitions within the U.S., where the acquirer owned less than 50% before the 
announcement and ended up with 100% of the company after the transaction was completed. 
They also included the following criteria:  
I. The transaction is listed as completed. 
II.  The deal value is greater than $1m. 
III.  The target is a U.S. public-, private- or subsidiary company. 
IV. The acquirer is a public firm listed on the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) during the event window. 
V. The deal value relative to the acquirer’s market value is more than 1%. 
VI. The number of days between the announcement and completion of the acquisition is 
between 0 and 1000. 
These criteria yielded a sample of 12,023 transactions between 1980 and 2001. They used the 
traditional event study methodology with a three day window [-1, 1]. They estimated the 
benchmark using the CRSP equally weighted index over a period from -205 to -6 days, 
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relative to the acquisition. They also estimated the abnormal returns by subtracting the market 
return from each firm’s return. Both methodologies yielded the same result. They found a 
CAR of 1.102% for their entire sample. Large acquirer’s, which they define as above the 25th 
percentile in terms of market cap for the companies listed at the NYSE during the acquisition 
announcement, received only a 0.076% bidder returns, while acquirer’s below the 25th 
percentile in size received 2.318%, (all significant on the 1% level). This is also supported by 
results from Bradley and Sundaram (2006), who found that bidder returns were negatively 
correlated with the acquirer’s total size.  
There are many different results concerning how the target’s relative size affects 
announcement returns. Studies like Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Asquith et al. (1983), and 
Loderer and Martin (1990) find that bidder announcement returns increase with the targets 
relative size, while studies such as Travlos (1987) find that bidder announcement returns 
decrease with the relative size of the target. The results found in Travlos (1987) are somewhat 
supported by Eckbo and Thorburn (2000), who found that that the abnormal returns for 
domestic (Canadian) bidders decreased as the relative target size increased. However, they 
found little evidence for significant foreign (U.S.) bidder gains regardless of size. Moreover, 
Moeller et al. (2004) found that the announcement returns for small acquirers were positively 
related to the targets relative size, while the returns of large acquirers were negatively related 
to the targets relative size. They partly attributed this to Roll (1986)’s hubris theory and 
argued that it is more likely for a manager of a large company to be overconfident and 
overpay for a target. 
The differences in the coefficients found on relative size in the previous paragraph can have 
several potential explanations. There is substantial evidence that the effect of the targets 
relative size on announcement returns depends on: (1) whether the target is private or public, 
and (2) whether the acquirer uses cash or stock to finance the acquisition. Bradley and 
Sundaram (2006), and Fuller et al. (2002) found that the bidder returns for the acquisition of 
public targets was negatively correlated with increasing relative target size while the opposite 
was true for private targets. 
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2.4 Research on target public status and method of payment 
Myers and Majluf (1984) focus on the difference in bidder returns for acquisitions made with 
different payment methods. They argue that bidders will use stock as the method of payment 
if they view their stock as overvalued, so announcing takeovers with stock as the method of 
payment often causes negative announcement returns. Empirical research supports this. 
Travlos (1987), Fishman (1989), Brown and Ryngart (1991), and Martin (1996) all find that 
bidders making cash offers have greater abnormal returns at bid announcement. This often 
causes targets to hesitate to accept stock as a payment method. It is important to note that if 
the bidder is uncertain about the target’s value, the bidder should want to offer stock, since the 
target will only accept a cash offer if it is above the true value of the target company, which 
means that the bidder usually overpays. 
Chang (1998) analysed bidder returns for acquirers of private companies from 1981 to 1992 
and compared it to the bidder returns of acquirers of public companies from 1981 to 1988. His 
sample selection yielded 281 privately held targets and 255 public targets. He found no 
significant abnormal returns for bidders who bought private targets with cash, but he did find 
a significant 2.64% return for bidders who acquired private targets with stock. He attributes 
this to the formation of blockholders of the acquirer’s shares after the acquisition process. 
Private companies usually have a very concentrated ownership structure, so the formation of 
blockholders of the acquirer’s stock is more likely when acquiring private companies.  Post-
acquisition blockholders can also arise as a result of the acquisition of a public company, as 
public companies are generally larger than private companies, but the larger relative size of 
public companies are most often offset by their dispersed ownership structure. 
The implication is that the new owners of the acquirer’s stock are better able to monitor the 
acquirer company’s management. Chang tested this hypothesis and found a 4.96% abnormal 
return in cases where new blockholders were formed versus a 1.77% return in cases with no 
ex-post blockholders. Fuller et al. (2002) argues that many private managers may use the 
acquisition as an exit strategy, and are not interested or able to monitor the acquirer’s 
management. Based on this, they conclude that the blockholder formation cannot conclusively 
explain the difference in abnormal returns for private and public targets. 
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Hansen and Lott (1996) examined the returns to bidders acquiring 252 private and public 
targets from 1985 to 1991. They found that bidders gained a 2% higher return when 
purchasing private companies, and cash offers had announcement returns 0.6 percentage 
points higher than stock offers, but they did not stratify this difference on public vs. private 
targets. They offered another explanation for the higher returns for bidders acquiring private 
targets. They argued that diversified investors are indifferent towards how the synergies are 
split between the acquirer and target when both companies are public and stockholders own 
shares in both companies. However, when the target is private, the acquirer stockholders can 
only benefit by capturing stock gains from the acquisition, assuming the bid is value 
increasing. 
Additionally, Bradley and Sundaram (2006) investigated bidder ACAR’s with a sample of 
12,476 acquisitions completed by 4116 public companies in the period between 1990 and 
2000. They found an ACAR [-2, 2] of 1.4% for their entire sample. Stratifying this sample on 
both method of payment and target public status revealed that the ACAR for public targets 
was 0.92% for cash offers, and -1.71% for stock offers. The announcement returns for private 
targets was 1.1% for cash offers and 1.69% for stock offers. All of these returns were 
significant at the 1% level. 
Furthermore, as mentioned in the introduction, Moeller et al. (2007) used a sample of 4,322 
all-cash and all-stock bids from 1980 to 2002. They found an ACAR [-1, 1] of 0.8% for their 
entire sample. For public targets the ACAR was -2.3% for all stock deals, and 0.7% for all-
cash deals. For private targets, the ACAR was 3.4% for all-stock deals. 
Savor (2006) used a sample of 1484 merger bids that occurred between 1990 and 2000. He 
found an ACAR [-1, 1] for the bidder of -3.5% for all-stock bidders and 1% for all-cash 
bidders. Furthermore, Martin (1996) finds that stock offers are more likely if there is more 
uncertainty about the bidder’s value.  
Moreover, Fuller et al. (2002) have studied bidder returns for companies that made five or 
more successful bids within three years from 1990 to 2000. They calculated ACAR during a 
five-day window [-2, 2]. They found significantly negative ACAR’s (-1%) for public targets 
and significantly positive ACAR’s (2.1%) for private targets. Moreover, they found 
significantly positive ACAR’s of 2.8% for subsidiary targets. They argue that this could be 
due to the fact that private companies might be priced with an implicit liquidity discount, as 
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they are not as easily traded as their public counterparts. This is also in line with the evidence 
that the bidder returns related to the acquisition of a private firm are more positive as the 
relative size of the target increases, while bidder returns related to the acquisition of public 
companies are more negative as the relative size of the target increases. Stratifying the sample 
based on method of payment, in addition to the targets public status, revealed that the bidder 
announcement returns for public targets were an insignificant 0.34% for cash offers, a 
significant -1.86% for stock offers, and a insignificant -1.1% for hybrid offers. For private 
targets the announcement returns were a significant 1.62% for cash offers, a significant 2.43% 
for stock offers, and 2.48% for hybrid offers. The bidder returns from the acquisition of public 
companies are consistent with the negative signalling effect of equity issues found in Myers 
and Majluf (1984), Smith (1986), and Andrade et al. (2011); and the bidder announcement 
returns for the acquisition of private targets are consistent with the blockholder effect found in 
(Chang, 1998). 
2.5 Research on frequent acquirers 
Various research conducted by consulting firms purports that the frequent acquisition of small 
firms results in superior returns for acquirers’ shareholders. These reports include Frick and 
Torres (2002) from McKinsey & Co.; Harding and Rovit (2004) from Bain & Co.; and Cools, 
King, Noonan, and Tsusaka (2004) from the Boston Consulting Group. They argue that 
smaller targets are easier to integrate into the acquiring company’s business operations. They 
also state that frequent acquisitions results in experience benefits, which translates into 
superior ex-post performance and higher bidder announcement returns. However, one could 
argue that the researchers from these consulting firms would be inclined to be biased towards 
reaching results that are favourable towards making frequent acquisitions due to the business 
they receive when they are consulting with firms that make these acquisitions.  
Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999), who used a sample of 449 acquisitions that occurred 
between 1980 and 1992, found that experience in acquisitive activities were – on a linear 
basis – negatively correlated with announcement returns. This is somewhat in line with results 
from Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005) that used a sample of 12,023 acquisitions that 
occurred between 1990 and 2001, who found that the acquirers that experienced the largest 
losses were previously successful serial-acquirers. However, including a squared control 
variable revealed that there was a “U” shaped relationship between experience and 
19 
 
performance related to acquisitions. This implies that there are some benefits to having 
experience in acquisitions beyond a certain point. They argue that this is because of two 
effects: inappropriate generalisation and experience. Inappropriate generalisation means that 
managers generalise and use strategies that have worked in the past on new acquisitions 
without further thought. This can lead to bad decision making and subsequent poor results. 
The inappropriate generalisation effect dominates until a certain point when the experience 
effect takes over and becomes the dominant effect. 
On the other hand, Bradley and Sundaram (2006), which, as mentioned previously, used a 
sample of 12,476 acquisitions that occurred between 1990 and 2000, found that frequent 
acquirers outperformed infrequent acquirers on a general basis. They defined frequent 
acquirers as firms that acquired more than four firms in their sample period. The fact that this 
finding deviates from the results uncovered in Moeller et al. (2005) and Haleblian and 
Finkelstein (1999) is surprising. However, it could be explained by the differences in sample 
time period. 
2.6 Summary of previous research 
Our section on previous literature can be summarized as follows: 
I. Bidder announcement returns are not significantly different from zero from the 
acquisition of public targets. 
II. Bidder announcement returns are positive for the acquisition of private targets 
III. The general negative market reaction to stock issuances in the U.S. makes it hard to 
infer to what extent the market views the acquisition itself as good or bad. 
IV. Specifically for public targets: 
o Acquirer announcement returns are negatively correlated with the relative size 
of the target 
o Acquirer announcement returns are more negative returns when stock is the 
method of payment 
V. Specifically for private Targets: 
o Acquirer announcement returns are positively correlated with the relative size 
of the target 
o Acquirer announcement returns are positive for cash offers, but even more 
positive for stock offers 
o The formation of blockholders in the targets ex-post ownership structure has a 
positive effect on acquirer announcement returns. 
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3. Hypotheses 
I. On average, there are no significant abnormal returns from the acquisition of 
public targets. 
II. On average, there are significant positive abnormal returns from the acquisition of 
private targets. 
III. Bidder announcement returns for acquirers of public targets are negative when 
stock is used as the method of payment 
IV. Bidder announcement returns for acquirers of private targets are greater when 
stock is used as the method of payment 
V. Bidder announcement returns are negatively related to the absolute size of the 
acquirer 
VI. Bidder announcement returns are greater for unrelated than related acquisitions 
VII. There are no acquirer industries that have an idiosyncratic advantage when 
conducting takeovers 
VIII. There are no target industries that have an idiosyncratic advantage that makes 
them better targets. 
IX. Bidder announcement returns for Norwegian acquirers are greater when acquiring 
domestic targets 
X. Acquiring a majority stake in a company increases the acquirer’s announcement 
returns. 
XI. Bidder announcement returns for acquirers of public targets are negatively 
correlated with the relative size of the target, while the bidder announcement 
returns for acquirers of private targets are positively correlated with the relative 
size of the target 
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4. Sample selection 
We have collected our data from the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) Mergers & 
Acquisitions database. The SDC database has information on 116,000+ U.S. transactions, and 
147,000+ non-U.S. transactions. It gathers this information from over 200 English and foreign 
language news sources; SEC filings and their international counterparts; trade publications; 
wires; and proprietary surveys of investment banks, law firms, and other advisors (FitzGerald 
2015). 
Our sample is selected based on the following criteria: 
I. The acquirer is listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE), or on the Oslo Axess Stock 
Exchange. 
II. The deal status is listed as “Completed”, which means that the deal has been accepted 
by both parties and was successfully completed. 
III. The deal was announced between January 1st 1962 and April 9th 2015.  
IV. The deal is defined as one of the following types: “Disclosed Value Mergers & 
Acquisitions”, “Undisclosed Value Mergers & Acquisitions”, “Tender Offer”, 
“Exchange offer”, “Minority Stake Purchases”, “Acquisition of Remaining Interest”. 
We have chosen to limit our acquirers to companies listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange and the 
Oslo Axess Stock Exchange to get a more appropriate basis for comparison of bidder 
announcement returns. This enables us to use a common benchmark.  
The list of deal types are chosen based on the criterion that they are acquisitions of other 
companies where the acquiring company remains public. Excluded deal types were Leveraged 
Buyouts, Share Repurchases, and Privatizations. 
Other papers, such as Fuller et al (2002) have limited their dataset to deals above a defined 
minimum deal value. However, we include all values in order to maintain variation in our 
dataset. Additionally, there is no reason to exclude deals with lower values as we use size as 
one of our control variable in our analysis. This initial sample selection process yields 1,677 
deals with 383 unique acquirers. 
The data on daily stock returns are taken from “Børsprosjektet”, which is a database at the 
Norwegian School of Economics. Børsprosjektet houses daily stock prices from 1984 for 
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companies listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange and Oslo Axess. These returns are adjusted for 
corporate specific events such as stock splits and dividends. 
The intersection of Børsprosjektet’s database of daily stock prices and SDC’s list of 
transactions limits our sample time-period to 31 years. This is a longer sample time-period 
than most earlier research papers on bidder returns, but we choose a longer sample period in 
order to get as much variation in the data as possible. 
One hindrance is that some firms have announced several acquisitions at the same date. 
Because of our chosen panel regression approach to the analysis (see section on 
methodology), we are not able to analyse deals announced by the same company at the same 
date. Specifically, deals announced on the same date by the same company may differ in their 
characteristics. As such, we are not able to estimate the effects of these characteristics 
separately, as we cannot determine how much each of these deal affected abnormal returns on 
the same day for the same company. Consequently, these deals were dropped from the 
dataset. 
Furthermore, some transactions in the SDC database lacked information about deal value. 
This variable is essential to our analysis, which led us to exclude 416 transactions. In addition, 
Børsprosjektet sometimes lacks historical data on companies that have changed their ticker 
symbol, while SDC Platinum changes the ticker retroactively to account for the new ticker 
symbol. Also, in some cases, SDC added an “o” at the end of some ticker symbols to indicate 
that the ticker was listed at Oslo Børs. This caused some problems with connecting the dataset 
with the transactions from SDC with the stock returns from Børsprosjektet. Initially, this 
resulted in the loss of corresponding stock return data for many of the transactions. However, 
through some additional research, we found many of the incorrect ticker symbols, changed 
them, and manually added them and their respective stock return data to our sample. We were 
thus able to increase the number of deals kept in the data set substantially. Finally, there was a 
minor issue that some stocks had no change in share price at the day of the announcement. 
There are three prevalent potential reasons for this: a lack of liquidity for the stock in question 
(no trades completed); a forced trade halt by the stock exchange at the day in question; or 
simply that the market’s expected net present value of the transaction, and other information 
that entered the market on that day, is zero (closing price turns out to be the same as the day 
before). We manually checked the trading history of the affected companies around the 
relevant dates, and found no signs of zero returns due to forced trade halts. As the zero returns 
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Table 3. Sample description – number of deals and aggregate deal value 
 
 
were not caused by trading halts, dropping the transactions with zero stock returns would be 
wrong, and would bias our results towards overestimating the impact of acquisitions. It is 
preferable to have a conservative bias, since subsequent significant results will be more robust 
than if we had dropped the deals with zero return. Our final sample turned out to be 740 
transactions conducted by 188 acquirers. 
Table 3 shows the number of transactions and the aggregate transaction value for each year 
from 1988 to 2014. The table shows that the highest level of acquisitive activities – both 
measured in number of deals and aggregate deal value - took place in the years before the 
2007/2008 financial crisis. As could be expected, the number of transactions, and aggregate 
deal value, dropped after the financial crisis. Furthermore, there is another peak and a 
subsequent drop during and after the year 2000, which corresponds in time to the dot-com 
bubble of 2000. Somewhat surprisingly, the aggregated deal value is substantially lower 
during the year 2000 than leading up to the crisis of 2007/2008. The current level of activity 
seems similar to the level of activity around the year 2002. 
 
Table 4, 5, and 6 stratify our sample by industry for public targets, private targets, and all 
targets. The sample contains 135 deals involving public targets and 605 deals where the 
targets are privately owned. The Mining industry; the Manufacturing industry; and the 
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Table 5. Sample Description – Deals by Industry 
Private Target Deals         
  Acquirers Targets 
  N Percentage N Percentage 
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 13 2.1% 21 3.5% 
Mining 69 11.4% 58 9.6% 
Construction 7 1.2% 18 3.0% 
Manufacturing 163 26.9% 154 25.5% 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, 
Gas and Sanitary 86 14.2% 77 12.7% 
Wholesale Trade 12 2.0% 23 3.8% 
Retail Trade 7 1.2% 13 2.1% 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 56 9.3% 45 7.4% 
Services 192 31.7% 196 32.4% 
Total 605 100% 605 100% 
 
 
Table 4. Sample Description – Deals by Industry 
Public Target Deals         
  Acquirers Targets 
  N Percentage N Percentage 
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 4 3.0% 8 5.9% 
Mining 25 18.5% 23 17.0% 
Construction 3 2.2% 1 0.7% 
Manufacturing 37 27.4% 44 32.6% 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, 
Gas and Sanitary 18 13.3% 20 14.8% 
Wholesale Trade 6 4.4% 5 3.7% 
Retail Trade 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 36 26.7% 17 12.6% 
Services 6 4.4% 17 12.6% 
Total 135 100% 135 100% 
 
 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate industry are the most acquisitive industries of public 
targets. The most acquisitive industries of private companies are Services and Manufacturing. 
There is a positive relationship between the number of acquirers and targets within an 
industry as about half of our sample is of related acquisitions. 
The specific details regarding how our final sample is distributed among related and unrelated 
acquisitions can be found in table 7. The sample is stratified based on SIC-codes, where “2D 
Common”, “3D Common”, and 4D Common” refers to acquisitions where the target and 
acquirer share the first two, three, and four digits in their main SIC-code, respectively. “0D 
Common” refers to acquisitions where the acquirer and target share zero digits in their main 
SIC-code. This means that it is an unrelated acquisition. 
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Table 6. Sample Description – Deals by Industry 
All Deals 
    
 
Acquirers Targets 
 
N Percentage N Percentage 
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 17 2.3% 29 3.9% 
Mining 94 12.7% 81 10.9% 
Construction 10 1.4% 19 2.6% 
Manufacturing 200 27.0% 198 26.8% 
Transportation, Communications, 
Electric, Gas and Sanitary 104 14.1% 97 13.1% 
Wholesale Trade 18 2.4% 28 3.8% 
Retail Trade 7 0.9% 13 1.8% 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 92 12.4% 62 8.4% 
Services 198 26.8% 213 28.8% 
 
740 100.0% 740 100.0% 
 
 
Table 7. Sample Description - Relatedness 
Non-Diversifying Deals 
       Public Target Private target Total 
 
N Percentage N Percentage N Percentage 
2D Common 8 5.9% 69 11.4% 77 10.4% 
3D Common 11 8.1% 76 12.6% 87 11.8% 
4D Common 42 31.1% 194 32.1% 236 31.9% 
0D Common 74 54.8% 266 44.0% 340 45.9% 
Total 135 100.0% 605 100.0% 740 100.0% 
 
 
 
The majority of transactions in our final sample is from after 2000. This is due to the 
aforementioned problem of missing deal values for some of the earlier transactions and 
connectivity issues with Børsprosjektet. The majority of the transactions in our sample were 
financed using cash as the method of payment. The relative amount of stock financed deals 
are similar for transactions involving both private and public targets, while the relative 
amount of hybrid offers are greater for transactions involving private targets. The number of 
foreign and domestic targets in our sample is relatively similar, as the sample consists of 
transactions with 240 domestic and 246 foreign targets. See table 8 for specific details 
regarding how our sample is distributed chronologically and stratified based on the acquirer’s 
method of payment, whether the target is foreign or domestic, and the target’s public status. 
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Table 8. Sample Description – Method of Payment 
 
Foreign targets Domestic targets 
 
Public Targets Private Targets Public Targets Private Targets 
 
Cash Stock Hybrid Cash Stock Hybrid Cash Stock Hybrid Cash Stock Hybrid 
1988 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1989 3 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 
1990 0 0 0 3 0 2 1 0 0 1 1 1 
1991 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 
1992 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 
1993 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 3 0 1 
1994 0 0 0 2 0 1 4 0 0 5 0 2 
1995 0 0 0 4 1 2 4 0 0 6 0 0 
1996 1 0 0 5 1 0 4 0 0 1 1 1 
1997 1 0 0 6 2 1 1 0 0 7 1 2 
1998 0 0 0 10 3 2 1 0 2 6 0 1 
1999 3 0 0 8 0 2 6 0 0 8 1 3 
2000 3 0 0 11 3 12 5 0 0 10 3 2 
2001 3 1 0 12 0 3 3 0 0 5 4 3 
2002 1 0 0 8 1 4 0 0 0 8 0 2 
2003 1 0 0 11 0 3 0 0 1 9 0 0 
2004 2 0 0 14 1 8 0 0 0 14 1 2 
2005 3 0 0 20 1 5 5 1 0 25 2 2 
2006 3 0 0 22 1 5 6 3 2 17 0 1 
2007 6 0 0 27 1 5 9 0 0 21 2 8 
2008 2 1 0 20 0 6 4 1 1 14 0 1 
2009 1 0 0 6 2 1 6 0 0 5 1 2 
2010 3 0 0 9 1 6 6 0 0 7 8 4 
2011 1 0 0 3 0 2 1 0 1 11 2 4 
2012 3 0 0 6 0 0 3 0 0 7 1 2 
2013 1 0 0 7 0 2 3 0 0 8 0 2 
2014 0 0 0 7 0 3 0 0 0 6 1 0 
Total 44 2 0 225 18 78 76 5 8 209 29 46 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 stratifies the initial sample of 1,677 transactions based on transaction experience. 
“Experience” denotes the number of transactions completed, including the recently announced 
deal, for the particular company making an announcement.  
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Table 9. Sample description – acquisition experience 
Experience Kept sample Dropped sample Total sample 
1 109 315 424 
2 79 158 237 
3 69 102 171 
4 63 65 128 
5 47 44 91 
6 46 34 80 
7 29 30 59 
8 22 21 43 
9 20 17 37 
10 21 14 35 
11 20 13 33 
12 16 13 29 
13 14 13 27 
14 10 11 21 
15 11 10 21 
16 10 10 20 
17 9 8 17 
18 11 6 17 
19 7 5 12 
20 9 5 14 
21 4 5 9 
22 7 5 12 
23 4 4 8 
24 5 3 8 
25 3 3 6 
26 4 3 7 
27 4 3 7 
28 7 3 10 
29 6 3 9 
30 2 3 5 
31 3 2 5 
32 3 2 5 
33 4 2 6 
34 4 1 5 
35 2 1 3 
36 5 - 5 
37 4 - 4 
38 3 - 3 
39 4 - 4 
40 4 - 4 
41 4 - 4 
42 2 - 2 
43 1 - 1 
44 2 - 2 
45 4 - 4 
46 4 - 4 
47 3 - 3 
48 3 - 3 
49 2 - 2 
50 2 - 2 
51 3 - 3 
52 2 - 2 
53 2 - 2 
54 - - - 
55 2 - 2 
Total 740 937 1677 
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The loss of 937 deals makes our sample susceptible to a sample selection bias. Bias could 
arise if the characteristics in the dropped sample (e.g. public status, method of payment, 
industry, relatedness) are substantially different from the characteristics in our final kept 
sample. We compared the characteristics of our final sample with the sample of deals that 
were dropped in order to assess whether the kept sample is likely to suffer from sample 
selection bias. This comparison, with the differences between the samples given in percentage 
points, is illustrated in table 10. This reveals that the kept and dropped sample is fairly similar. 
However, there are some notable deviations with an 11 and 14 percentage point difference in 
the service industry for targets and acquirers, respectively, and an 8 percentage point 
difference in the number of diversifying acquisitions. We believe that, even with these 
discrepancies, the comparison confirms that the sample does not particularly suffer from 
sample selection bias.  
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Table 10. Sample Description – Deals by Industry 
 
Kept Sample Dropped Sample Difference 
N 740 937 
     Domicile: 
   Domestic target 50% 53% -3% 
Foreign target 50% 47% 3% 
    Public status: 
   Public target 18% 17% 1% 
Private target 82% 83% -1% 
    Relatedness: 
   2D Common 10% 10% 0% 
3D Common 13% 7% 6% 
4D Common 32% 30% 2% 
0D Common 45% 53% -8% 
    Target industry: 
   Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 4% 3% 1% 
Mining 11% 10% 1% 
Construction 3% 2% 0% 
Manufacturing 27% 32% -5% 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, 
 Gas and Sanitary 13% 16% -3% 
Wholesale Trade 4% 4% 0% 
Retail Trade 2% 2% 0% 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 8% 12% -4% 
Services 29% 18% 11% 
    Acquirer industry: 
   Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 2% 1% 1% 
Mining 13% 13% 0% 
Construction 1% 2% -1% 
Manufacturing 27% 30% -3% 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, 
 Gas and Sanitary 14% 18% -3% 
Wholesale Trade 2% 3% -1% 
Retail Trade 1% 2% -1% 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 12% 18% -6% 
Services 27% 13% 14% 
    Payment method*: 
   N 749 332 
 Cash 75% 74% 1% 
Stock 7% 13% -5% 
Hybrid 18% 14% 4% 
    Unspecified - 605 
 
 
*The percentages for the dropped sample excludes 605 
  transactions where payment method is "Unspecified" 
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5. Control variables 
The SDC database allows us to collect data on various deal characteristics for each 
transaction. We use the data on these transactions to test the relationship between 
announcement returns and these deal characteristics. 
The first characteristic we test for is which days surrounding the transaction provide 
significant abnormal announcement returns. We do this by testing each day for one month, 
which is 20 trading days, before and after the announcement of the acquisition. We only 
conduct further research on the days that are significant, as the insignificant days are not 
relevant to our analysis. 
We also test whether the target is Norwegian (domestic) or foreign and how this influences 
bidder returns. This is easily done because the SDC database lists the target’s country of 
origin. Differences in announcement returns based on the fact that the target is foreign or 
domestic might indicate that the market believes that the acquirer has more information about 
a domestic target and is therefore more suited to acquire domestic targets.  
We also see whether the target company’s industry, which we classify based on the 
company’s main Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code, affects bidder announcement 
returns. This is done in two forms: First, we test for whether the fact that the target and 
acquirer is in the same industry affects bidder returns. This is to assess whether there exists 
some form of “relatedness” effect. One could argue that an acquiring firm in the same 
industry as the target is better suited to pick “good” targets than an acquirer from an unrelated 
industry. Second, we see whether there exists a general relationship between bidder returns 
and the target’s and acquirer’s industry separately, Some industries could have idiosyncratic 
characteristics, which makes them better targets or acquirers, such as lots of fixed assets. 
Moreover, we also test whether there is some form of relationship between bidder returns and 
whether the target is public or private. Private firms are not as easily traded as their public 
counterparts are, so the price of a private firm might include an implicit liquidity discount. 
Moreover, public firms should be more efficiently priced than private firms as their market 
values are the result of continuous transactions between buyers and sellers of shares in the 
company. Finally, bidder returns could also be affected by the fact that private firms generally 
have a more concentrated ownership on a general basis. 
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The next control variable we test for is the relative size between the target and the acquirer. 
The size of the acquirer is defined as the market capitalization of the acquirer’s equity four 
weeks prior to announcement, while the deal value is used as a proxy for the target’s size. 
Deal value is chosen as a proxy for the target’s size because a majority of our targets are 
private. If the target is too small relative to the acquirer, the bidder returns attributable to the 
announcement of the takeover might disappear within the regular volatility of the stock. 
We also test for whether method of payment has any effect on bidder returns. The most 
appropriate variable for this is “Consideration Offered”. This is the consideration that the 
acquirer offers at or right after the announcement of the acquisition. SDC had a lot of different 
categories that described the consideration structure, which included items such as earnouts, 
assumed liabilities, cash, and different classes of equity. We sorted the different categories 
used by SDC’s and grouped them as either Cash, Stock, or Hybrid. Cash is the consideration 
structure where the acquirer uses cash exclusively to acquire the target, stock the category 
where the acquirer only uses equity to acquire the target, and Hybrid is the consideration 
structure that mixes any different types of considerations, or any method of payment that does 
not fulfil the criteria of “cash” or “stock”. 
As mentioned, previous research uncover that the effects of size and method of payment are 
dependent on the target’s public status. In order to test for the same kinds of effects, we 
include several interaction terms. Specifically, we interact the target’s public status with the 
different size controls and method of payment controls. 
Furthermore, we test for whether companies that make frequent acquisitions have some form 
of experience benefit and receive higher bidder returns than companies that make few 
acquisitions. We test for this by simply including the acquisition experience of companies, i.e. 
how many successful acquisitions they have conducted at the relevant point in time. 
Moreover, we see whether gaining control of the target company affects the acquirer’s return. 
An acquiring company needs control over the target in order to effectively realize synergies. 
We have defined “Control” as a 50% ownership stake, or more. That is to say we do not 
consider an acquisition to involve change of control if the acquirer does not end up controlling 
a 50% or larger stake, and equally so if the acquirer owned more than 50% ex-ante. It is 
important to note that owners can in many cases effectively control a company with less than 
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a 50% ownership stake, but we think that this threshold is less arbitrary than other levels of 
ownership, as it is the ownership stake needed in order to have a simple majority. 
Finally, we analyse whether there is any pattern between bidder announcement returns across 
time-periods. Economic cycles could be expected to influence how the market reacts to the 
announcement of an acquisition. 
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6. Methodology 
6.1 Abnormal returns 
The central measurement issue in M&A is how to determine the abnormal returns caused by 
such activity. In other words, what are the excess returns to shareholders of acquiring, or 
target, companies, caused by the acquisition? The most common approach is to look at 
abnormal returns of a security around the time of the announcement of M&A events, known 
as announcement returns. The rationale behind this approach is that the price reactions of the 
security at the time of the announcement is the most reliable way to isolate the specific effects 
of the M&A deal.  
 
A different approach would be to measure company financial performance before and after 
the consummation of the deal. However, this approach is problematic because it would 
require the measurement of company performance over long periods, which would subject to 
large amounts of noise not attributable to the deal. Also, it is impossible to get financials for 
many firms before the deal (e.g. because they are private). 
 
Returning to announcement returns, the idea underlying this approach is that the market 
reveals its aggregate opinion about the value of the deal. If the market thinks the deal has a 
positive (negative) value for either the acquirer or the target, the market will bid up (down) 
the share price of the traded security of the acquirer or target. If security prices incorporate all 
future expectations about a company’s value – which, on average, is a reasonable assumption 
– then, the security price should change in order to reflect all expected values from any 
prospective M&A activity. Importantly, security prices react quickly to news affecting the 
perceived value of a company, which means that the perceived value (positive or negative) 
from M&A deals should be reflected as soon as news of such activities becomes available. Of 
course, market expectations about any value from a particular M&A deal are by no means 
guaranteed to be accurate. Still, the speed with which expectations about a company is 
incorporated into the security price makes it possible to isolate the effects from M&A in a 
convincing manner. A more subtle point is that even though the security may appreciate 
(depreciate) before any real gain (loss) from the deal has actually materialized, a shareholder 
may choose to sell the security immediately after said appreciation. This means that any 
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announcement returns may in fact create real value for shareholders, further making the case 
for why we should care about announcement returns.  
 
A limitation of announcement returns is that they will not accurately reflect the actual 
consensus opinion about the value of the deal itself. This is because that the share price of 
both acquirer and target following an announcement will take into account the consensus 
probability of the deal going through. This can be observed by studying all-stock transactions. 
If company “A” announces its bid for the acquisition of company “B” in a one share-for-share 
transaction, the share price of “B” should be equal to “A” immediately after the 
announcement. This is often not the case, precisely because of the uncertainty of the deal 
actually going through. Some financial actors specialize in collecting information about 
announced M&A events, and employ a trading strategy known as “merger arbitrage”, seeking 
to make a profit if they believe the prices of “A” and “B” does not reflect their own, more 
informed, opinion about the probability of the deal going through. To be clear, this strategy 
does not exploit an actual arbitrage opportunity, since the strategy is not without risk: the 
arbitrageur could be wrong about the probabilities. If the arbitrageur thinks the probability of 
the deal going through is higher than market prices imply, he will want to short-sell the stock 
of the acquirer, and buy the stock of the acquisition target. 
 
6.2 Classic event study methodology 
The normal approach to estimating abnormal returns is through a so-called event study, as 
described in papers like MacKinlay (1997). The traditional approach involves estimating 
some kind of normal return for a company in  a pre-event estimation window, and then 
computing abnormal returns in the actual event window by subtracting the normal return from 
the actual return in the event window. Typically, this approach entails a simple market model. 
 
 
Post-Event WindowEstimation Window Event Window
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               ̂     ̂        
 
         is the abnormal excess (actual less risk-free) return in the event widow for company i 
from event y;      is the total excess return for company i in the event window for event y; 
 ̂    is the estimated alpha for company i in the pre-event estimation window before event y; 
 ̂      is the pre-event estimated regression coefficient on the market excess return,     , 
before event y. The standard approach involves estimating alpha and beta coefficients for each 
company using a pre-event window, defined by the researcher, respective to each individual 
deal. Abnormal returns are then calculated by subtracting the estimated alpha and market 
correlated returns from the total returns in the event window. Finally, in the case of abnormal 
returns from M&A, the abnormal returns are aggregated for each event (if the event window 
extends over several periods, e.g. days) to create cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), and 
then averaged over the sample of deals. An analysis then usually follows, where different 
average CARs are analysed depending on how the M&A deals are stratified. 
 
6.3 Problems and solutions regarding the classic event study 
The approach described above has, in our opinion, three particularly severe limitations. I) the 
market model allows companies predictable alpha coefficients – alpha is implicitly treated as 
predictable, since it is consequently subtracted from returns occurring at a later point in time; 
(II) the pre-event estimation window does not account for the possibility of the same company 
doing several deals in close time proximity; and (III) event windows are usually defined in an 
arbitrary way. 
 
If we believe that markets are efficient, or even somewhat efficient, share prices should, by 
definition, not be predictable. Any predictability should be arbitraged away very quickly. This 
means that a stock should not be able to produce predictable alpha returns over time, which is 
exactly what the “classic” event-study approach is allowing for. Forcing abnormal returns to 
account for company specific alphas will bias the results if observed alphas are random, 
which is our assertion. Our model, which will be discussed in detail later, uses a random 
effects regression model, which assumes that any company specific differences in returns not 
explained by control variables are random. Furthermore, we also econometrically reject the 
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hypothesis that a fixed effects model is preferable to a random effects model. In this way, we 
remove potential bias that arises from company-specific alphas.  
 
In the “classic” approach, if the pre-event estimation window for event y were to overlap with 
other deals done by a specific company, without accounting for these, then the other deals 
could potentially bias the estimated coefficients that are only treated as relevant to event y. 
For example, assume that all abnormal returns from M&A for a certain company are in reality 
positive. If the pre event estimation window for a specific deal overlaps with several other 
deals in the past, the positive returns from the previous deals would be interpreted as part of 
the “normal” returns for this company. If this were the case, the abnormal returns for the deal 
in question would be attenuated, since the estimated coefficients predict that normal returns 
from this company are always high. Our model uses panel data, with continuous time series 
data for each company. We include M&A event dummies for each event in each company. In 
this way, the regression coefficients will not be biased due to previous (or future) deals.  
 
Finally, other research on returns from M&A transactions usually just assume some more or 
less arbitrary event window around the announcement of an M&A transaction. Minus 2 to 
plus 2, and minus 5 to plus 5 days before and after an announcement are popular event 
windows, which are used in the research papers we have cited in the previous research 
section. This means that there is no testing for the actual significance of abnormal returns for 
the individual chosen days. The average CAR could be tested for significance, but this would 
reveal only whether the estimated average abnormal returns for the whole event window are 
significantly different from zero, i.e. some of the individual days could be strongly significant 
and others not significant at all. The problem with arbitrary event windows is that a lot of 
information and insight is lost in the process, when one could alternatively (and easily) 
determine which days that in fact do produce abnormal returns. This insight could, for 
instance, help to address the issue of market efficiency in stock markets. That is to say, the 
more concentrated the abnormal returns are around the actual time of announcement, the more 
evidence in favour of the theory of efficient markets.  Our model, in its initial iteration, adds 
controls for several days before and after an announcement, in an effort to establish which 
days that are actually significant with respect to abnormal returns and announcements. This 
approach makes the best use of the collected data.  
 
37 
 
6.4 The Model 
As mentioned above, we employ a random effects model on panel data. The panel data are 
comprised of deals extracted from the SDC Platinum database, which is merged with data on 
daily stock prices for the relevant acquirers, provided by Børsprosjektet at NHH. The model 
can be expressed in the following way: 
 
                      ∑                             
 ∑                       ( )    ∑             ( )             
 
Where      represents the one-day return on stock i after closing on day t, and is the dependent 
variable in the model.    is the coefficient for company i’s interaction with the day t one-day 
return on the chosen index (OSEBX), and is analogous to each company’s market beta.  
 
When considering market beta coefficients, an argument could be made that betas are likely to 
change following acquisitions. Especially so if the transaction target is relatively large, or if 
the target industry is more (or less) sensitive to market fluctuations than the acquirer industry. 
In an efficient market, it is reasonable to assume that investors immediately determine how 
the announced acquisition is likely to affect the market beta of the acquirer, and, 
consequently, update their opinion on how the equity of the acquirer should be priced relative 
to movements in the market index. To account for this possibility, we include what we call 
step-betas. Consider the dummy        which is zero until company i announces its deal l. 
After company i’s announcement of its deal l, this dummy will take the value 1 forever. As 
such, the dummy represents a step (from zero to 1) relative to deal l. Note that each company, 
i, makes its own distinct number of    deals. The dummy is interacted with the market return, 
and      is the coefficient on this interaction. In other words,      is the added effect on overall 
market beta for company i after announcement of its deal l, and we refer to this added effect 
as a step-beta. This allows us to control for any potential changes in market betas caused by 
acquisition activity, and, as far as we know, we are the first to implement this kind of control 
into an analysis of abnormal returns. Of course, market betas of companies could also change 
due to events other than M&A, e.g. after major capital restructurings or change in business 
segment. Still, we believe that the step-betas are a useful contribution in the context of M&A 
analysis, and serve as a general improvement to the accuracy of market betas. 
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In addition, there is an issue with regards to the length of time over which market betas should 
be estimated. There are no universally accepted standards in this regard, although two or five 
years of weekly or monthly returns are sometimes used. Since it is not clear what estimation 
window is optimal for market betas, we retain all our data and estimate betas for the entire 
sample period. Furthermore, the inclusion of the mentioned step-betas should also serve to 
correct for changes in market betas. 
 
The   coefficients express the average effect of different announcement dummies, where 
announcement dummies are either 0 or 1, depending on the observed day and company. For 
example,           is the average effect on daily return on days when 
                 (        )    is equal to 1, which is to say that a company i 
announced an M&A event on day t. Similarly,                  (           )    is 
equal to 1 when company i announced an M&A event on day t – 5, and              is the 
average effect on daily return from having made an announcement five days ago, and so on.  
 
The model also allows for controls other than announcement dummies. For example, if we 
believe that the acquisition target being publicly or privately traded is important for abnormal 
returns, then the model could include the control variable dummy        (             )   , 
which will be equal to 1 when the M&A event announced by company i on day t involved a 
public acquisition target. We construct control variables so that they can only be different 
from zero on corresponding announcement dates. Consequently, since 
       (             )    can only be equal to 1 when there is an announcement, there is no 
need to interact the control dummy with announcement dummies; and, in the previous 
example, the coefficients on announcement day dummies will now reflect the average effect 
on abnormal returns of making an announcement regarding the acquisition of a privately 
traded target. Naturally,                would be the average difference on daily return when 
announcing the acquisition of a public, rather than a private, company, ceteris paribus. 
The model has two error terms.    is the unobserved company specific error term attributable 
to company i.  Since this is a random effects model,    is by definition assumed to be random 
(i.e. there are no company specific persistent alphas). The second error term,     , is the 
idiosyncratic error, which varies with company and time. 
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This model has some advantages over the classic approach, in addition to those described in 
the previous section. First, the model allows data for all companies and deals to be run in the 
same regression, whereas, as mentioned previously, the classic approach is to calculate CARs 
for each separate deal through individual regressions. This adds an element of simplicity and 
transparency, making results more readable and intuitive.  
 
The second, and more important, advantage is that the model allows us to include and test 
several control variables at the same time. In the classic approach, the established way to 
control for characteristics of M&A deals is to separate deals into different groups and test for 
differences in CARs between groups. In the classic approach, therefore, it is only practical to 
analyse the effect of one control variable at the time, and said controls can effectively only be 
dummies, since deals are only distinguished by the group to which they belong. This severely 
limits the usefulness of an analysis. Of course, one could in principal create many sub-groups 
of deals, but interpretation and testing would become increasingly cumbersome as the number 
of sub-groups increases. Our model makes it easy to interpret the ceteris paribus effects of a 
large number of control variables, all in one regression. 
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7. Empirical results 
7.1 The event window 
As discussed in the section on method, a natural starting point for the analysis of abnormal 
returns from M&A will be to identify exactly for which days around an announcement 
abnormal returns are actually significantly different from zero. This is a crucial step towards 
obtaining insight into the nature of abnormal returns; such insight is lost when using the 
established method of making an assumption regarding the appropriate event window, and 
aggregating abnormal returns in the event window into CAR. Our approach in this regard is to 
include dummies for 20 trading days (approximately four weeks) prior to- and 20 trading days 
after the day of announcement (day zero). 
 
The regression shown in Table 11 is for all daily stock returns, including the announcement 
days of 740 deals, regressed on the dummy variables displayed, as well as for company-
specific dummies (not shown, available on request) and step-beta dummies (not shown, 
available on request) interacted with the return on the OSEBX index; all returns are in 
percentage points. The company-specific, including step-beta, interactions with the index are 
analogous to company-specific market (Oslo Stock Exchange) beta coefficients. Step-beta 
interactions, as explained in the methodology section, account for the possibility that 
company-specific betas may change after acquisitions. The interactions also make it possible 
to compute average abnormal returns for all deals in one regression, while most other studies 
do one regression per M&A event, and then compute average abnormal returns subsequently. 
 
The Day zero dummy takes the value 1 for days when there was an announcement of an 
M&A event, and zero otherwise. Similarly Minus 19 days takes the value 1 when there will be 
an announcement in 19 days, and zero otherwise, and so on for the other dummies. 
 
The most striking result is the significance of the coefficient of the Day zero dummy, which is 
significant at the 0.1% level. The coefficient predicts that the daily return on a stock will, on 
average, be approximately 1.09 percentage points higher on a day when there is an 
announcement of an M&A event, ceteris paribus. 
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Table 11. Regression output – 20 days before and after the announcement 
 
Coef. Std. err. t-stat p-value 
Minus 20 days 0.0145 0.132 0.11 0.912 
Minus 19 days 0.0695 0.131 0.53 0.597 
Minus 18 days -0.1314 0.131 -1 0.317 
Minus 17 days 0.1182 0.131 0.9 0.369 
Minus 16 days 0.013 0.131 0.1 0.921 
Minus 15 days 0.0192 0.132 0.15 0.884 
Minus 14 days -0.0729 0.132 -0.55 0.579 
Minus 13 days 0.0393 0.132 0.3 0.765 
Minus 12 days 0.1285 0.131 0.98 0.327 
Minus 11 days -0.1161 0.132 -0.88 0.378 
Minus 10 days 0.0017 0.132 0.01 0.99 
Minus 9 days 0.0504 0.132 0.38 0.702 
Minus 8 days 0.1567 0.132 1.19 0.236 
Minus 7 days 0.1682 0.132 1.28 0.202 
Minus 6 days -0.0067 0.132 -0.05 0.959 
Minus 5 days -0.0288 0.132 -0.22 0.827 
Minus 4 days 0.2067 0.132 1.56 0.118 
Minus 3 days 0.1404 0.133 1.06 0.29 
Minus 2 days 0.1075 0.132 0.81 0.417 
Minus 1 day 0.2083 0.133 1.57 0.117 
Day zero 1.0915*** 0.135 8.08 0 
Plus 1 day 0.1155 0.132 0.87 0.382 
Plus 2 days -0.1475 0.132 -1.12 0.263 
Plus 3 days -0.0077 0.132 -0.06 0.954 
Plus 4 days -0.0826 0.132 -0.63 0.531 
Plus 5 days -0.1342 0.132 -1.02 0.309 
Plus 6 days 0.0527 0.132 0.4 0.69 
Plus 7 days 0.1289 0.132 0.98 0.327 
Plus 8 days 0.0918 0.132 0.7 0.486 
Plus 9 days -0.1039 0.132 -0.79 0.431 
Plus 10 days 0.0633 0.132 0.48 0.631 
Plus 11 days -0.1054 0.132 -0.8 0.424 
Plus 12 days -0.0005 0.132 0 0.997 
Plus 13 days -0.002 0.132 -0.02 0.988 
Plus 14 days 0.0072 0.132 0.05 0.957 
Plus 15 days 0.187 0.132 1.42 0.155 
Plus 16 days -0.0224 0.132 -0.17 0.865 
Plus 17 days -0.0397 0.132 -0.3 0.763 
Plus 18 days -0.0154 0.132 -0.12 0.907 
Plus 19 days -0.0277 0.131 -0.21 0.833 
Plus 20 days -0.0354 0.131 -0.27 0.788 
     _cons 0.0355*** 0.005 7.55 0 
N 615 883 
   r2_w 0.0823 
   r2_b 0.1359 
   r2_o 0.0823 
   * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. *** p<0.001 
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Interestingly, none of the coefficients on the dummies for days before or after announcements 
are statistically significant at the same level as Day zero, or even remotely near this level. The 
strongest significance, except for at day zero, are for the coefficients on dummies for one and 
four days before announcement. Coefficients for days one and four have t-values of 1.57 and 
1.56 (p-values of 0.117 and 0.118), and predicted positive abnormal returns of approximately 
0.21 percentage points, respectively. However, the coefficient on the dummy for two days 
before announcement is, while positive, not even slightly significant with a t-value of 0.81. 
We cannot reasonably expect abnormal returns to be predictably positive four days prior to- 
but not two days prior to announcement. As such, we cannot reject that positive coefficients 
on days around, but not including, day zero are random. Still, the fact that coefficients from 
four days to one day after announcement is somewhat interesting. 
 
Given the results, the day of interest in relation to abnormal returns from M&A is clearly the 
actual day of announcement, or day zero. In addition, this result is supports the theory of 
market efficiency. Strong persistent abnormal returns before announcements would suggest 
some kind of insider trading. Persistent abnormal returns after announcements would suggest 
that important information about companies is not immediately reflected in the stock price. 
Since there is no clear and convincing trend in days immediately before or after 
announcements, these data support the assertion of efficient markets.    
 
The focus from here on will be on explaining the observed abnormal return on day zero, and 
we conclude that other days surrounding the announcement day does not produce abnormal 
returns that are significantly different from zero. 
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7.2 Controlling for the characteristics of the M&A event   
The next step of the analysis is to control for different characteristics of the deal, in order to 
explain what actually drives the abnormal returns. We include several variables in order to 
control for the hypothesized effects described in the control variables.  
 
The regression shown in Table 12 analyses 740 deals, and includes several control variables 
that may explain the observed abnormal returns; in addition, company-specific dummies, 
interacted with the index return, are included, as before (not shown, available on request). All 
control variables are constructed so that they can only be different from zero if there is an 
announcement (day zero). This way, controls are de facto interacted with the dummy for 
announcement, without having to add the actual interactions to the regression. 
 
The coefficient on the dummy for deals that involve foreign acquisition targets is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero, which means that there is no predicted effect from acquiring a 
foreign versus domestic company. One could think, ceteris paribus, that acquisitions of 
domestic targets would yield greater bidder announcement returns than foreign targets 
because it should be easier to realize synergies with domestic targets, due to factors such as 
geographical proximity and local knowledge. The fact that the announcement returns are 
similar for domestic and foreign targets could be due to an offsetting effect of greater 
potential for returns in foreign markets. It would be interesting to test how acquirers from 
different countries fared in the same markets as our sample and do a comparison, like Eckbo 
and Thorburn (2000) did, in order to try and separate the effects of the amount of potential 
synergies and the potential for synergy realization. 
 
With respect to abnormal returns caused by differences in method of payment, acquisitions of 
private targets where the offered consideration was all cash is used as the omitted case. The 
regression includes interactions between the target’s public status and the method of payment, 
in order to test the hypothesis previously put forward: that the effect of method of payment on 
abnormal returns is dependent on the targets public status. 
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Table 12. Regression output – All targets (1/2) 
 
Coef. Std. err. t-stat p-value 
Day zero 1.1497 1.062 1.08 0.279 
     Foreign target -0.0605 0.297 -0.20 0.838 
All stock offer 3.4694*** 0.616 5.63 0.000 
Hybrid offer 0.0730 0.402 0.18 0.856 
Cash int Public -0.0589 0.659 -0.09 0.929 
All stock offer int Public -5.5585** 1.853 -3.00 0.003 
Hybrid offer int Public -1.4689 1.768 -0.83 0.406 
     Acquirer size -0.0001** 0.000 -2.77 0.006 
Acquirer size int Public -0.0000 0.000 -0.28 0.782 
Relative value -0.0364* 0.016 -2.29 0.022 
Relative value^2 0.0008*** 0.000 5.62 0.000 
Relative value^3 -0.0000*** 0.000 -5.89 0.000 
Relative value int Public -0.0407 0.059 -0.69 0.489 
Relative value^2 int Public 0.0009 0.001 0.97 0.333 
Relative value^3 int Public -0.0000 0.000 -1.42 0.156 
     Experience -0.0319* 0.014 -2.31 0.021 
     Year 1988 -1.9029 3.749 -0.51 0.612 
Year 1989 -1.1102 1.825 -0.61 0.543 
Year 1990 -0.8015 1.553 -0.52 0.606 
Year 1991 -4.7732* 1.994 -2.39 0.017 
Year 1992 -1.5832 1.775 -0.89 0.372 
Year 1993 0.1349 1.597 0.08 0.933 
Year 1994 -0.7534 1.402 -0.54 0.591 
Year 1995 -0.5282 1.340 -0.39 0.693 
Year 1996 -2.7372* 1.381 -1.98 0.047 
Year 1997 0.4827 1.242 0.39 0.697 
Year 1998 -0.1381 1.199 -0.12 0.908 
Year 1999 -0.3450 1.155 -0.30 0.765 
Year 2000 -0.6484 1.080 -0.60 0.548 
Year 2001 -0.6179 1.124 -0.55 0.582 
Year 2002 0.5731 1.202 0.48 0.633 
Year 2003 0.5394 1.183 0.46 0.649 
Year 2004 0.0202 1.097 0.02 0.985 
Year 2005 -0.5488 1.042 -0.53 0.599 
Year 2006 1.2845 1.046 1.23 0.219 
Year 2007 0.4071 1.018 0.40 0.689 
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Table 12. Regression output – all targets (2/2) 
 
Coef. Std. err. t-stat p-value 
Year 2008 2.0375 1.068 1.91 0.056 
Year 2009 0.7904 1.212 0.65 0.514 
Year 2010 -0.2526 1.091 -0.23 0.817 
Year 2011 1.5708 1.187 1.32 0.186 
Year 2012 2.2023 1.228 1.79 0.073 
Year 2013 -1.6329 1.224 -1.33 0.182 
Year 2014 0.0000 . . . 
     No control -0.4244 0.402 -1.06 0.291 
     2D common SIC -1.5135** 0.505 -3.00 0.003 
3D common SIC -1.0519* 0.496 -2.12 0.034 
4D common SIC -0.8628* 0.348 -2.48 0.013 
     Agriculture acquirer 1.4944 1.188 1.26 0.209 
Mining acquirer 1.1990 0.706 1.70 0.089 
Construction acquirer 2.5691 1.413 1.82 0.069 
Manufacturing acquirer 0.4692 0.517 0.91 0.364 
Transportation acquirer 1.6131** 0.607 2.66 0.008 
Wholesale acquirer -0.9964 1.013 -0.98 0.325 
Retail acquirer 0.8028 1.892 0.42 0.671 
Finance acquirer 0.2390 0.624 0.38 0.702 
Services acquirer 0.0000 . . . 
     Agriculture target -0.0118 0.968 -0.01 0.990 
Mining target 1.9171** 0.704 2.72 0.006 
Construction target -1.6656 1.028 -1.62 0.105 
Manufacturing target 0.5665 0.499 1.14 0.256 
Transportation target -0.9139 0.603 -1.52 0.130 
Wholesale target -0.0098 0.805 -0.01 0.990 
Retail target -1.0169 1.459 -0.70 0.486 
Finance target -0.5013 0.681 -0.74 0.462 
Services target 0.0000 . . . 
     _cons 0.0367*** 0.005 7.97 0.000 
     N 615,883 
  r2_within 0.0828 
   r2_between 0.1289 
   r2_overall 0.0828 
   * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
   
     Note: "int" denotes interaction 
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The model predicts a 3.47 percentage point positive effect on abnormal returns, on average, 
when the consideration offered is all stock and the target company is private, compared to the 
omitted case mentioned above. This effect is economically large and significant at the 0.1% 
level. This is consistent with research, such as by Chang (1998), who attributed the greater 
returns when stock was offered to a private target to the rise of ex-post blockholder ownership 
in the acquiring company due to the concentrated ownership in private companies. If the 
target is publicly traded and consideration offered is all stock, the model predicts, on average, 
a 5.56 percentage point negative effect on abnormal returns, in addition to the effect described 
for private targets. This additional effect is economically large and significant at the 1% level. 
This is supported by research such as Bradley and Sundaram (2006), and Moeller et al (2007), 
who found (compared to stock- and cash deals for private targets and cash deals for public 
targets) more negative announcement returns for acquirers who used stock to acquire a public 
target. 
 
The model does not predict any difference in abnormal returns, on average, when the 
consideration offered is all cash and the target is publicly traded, compared to the omitted 
case. This is not consistent with research on the U.S. markets e.g. Fuller et al (2002) and 
Bradley and Sundaram (2006) who both find greater announcement returns for acquisitions of 
private targets when cash is the method of payment. There is also no predicted effect from a 
hybrid offer, irrespective of target public status, compared to the omitted case. Fuller et al. 
found mixed evidence on hybrid offers with significant abnormal returns for private targets, 
but insignificant abnormal returns for public targets. Given the results, it is worthwhile 
refitting the model for private and public targets separately. 
 
Different measures of size feature heavily in previous research on M&A, and, based on this, 
we choose to look at the effect of size both with respect to the absolute size of the acquirer, 
and the relative size of the deal to the acquirer. 
 
The model predicts that absolute size of the acquirer will have a negative effect on abnormal 
returns, when the target is private, with no significant additional effect predicted for public 
targets. The coefficient on acquirer size predicts that a one billion USD increase in acquirer 
market capitalization (four weeks prior to announcement), on average, causes a 0.05 
percentage point decrease in abnormal returns, ceteris paribus. The effect is significant at the 
1 % level. This is consistent with the research conducted in Moeller et al. (2004), who argued, 
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Figure 1. Relative size effect – all targets 
 
 
as mentioned previously, that large companies are more likely to have managers with hubris 
and are thus more likely to overpay for targets. 
 
The relative value of deals is calculated as the value of the deal divided by the market 
capitalization of the acquirer four weeks prior to announcement. This is standard procedure to 
ensure that value accretion to the acquirer, from the announcement itself, is not included in 
the market capitalization. The effect on abnormal returns is modelled including squared and 
cubed terms, and is clearly significant, while the predicted additional effect for public targets 
is not significant. The actual effect is more obvious when graphing the predicted effects. 
Figure 1 shows the predicted effect on abnormal returns from relative deal size for all 740 
deals. Figure 2 shows the predicted effects for deals with relative value of less than 100%, and 
gives a more in-depth look into the relative size effect, since most deals (717) have a relative 
value below this threshold. The estimated effect is extremely large for a few outliers with 
unusually high relative value, with the largest estimated effect at approximately 18% one-day 
abnormal return due to relative size, and a relative size of 273%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Looking at deals with relative size less than 100% of the acquirer reveals a more normalized 
effect, although the direction of the effect is not straight forward. The model predicts negative 
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Figure 2. Relative size effect – all targets with relative value of 0% to 100% 
 
 
abnormal returns, and increasingly so,  from relative value 0% until it bottoms out at 
approximately 0.43 percentage point negative abnormal return and 25% relative value (not 
considering the public interaction effects). From here, predicted abnormal returns increase and 
turn positive at approximately 51% relative value, after which the predicted abnormal returns 
continue to rise. Computing predicted abnormal returns for deals with public targets, 
including interaction effects (which are not significant), reveal approximately the same 
relationship as for private targets, except that the effect on abnormal returns now bottom out 
at 0.93 percentage point negative return. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The fact that the initial effect of relative value on announcement returns are negative is 
surprising given the fact that our sample contains more private targets (605) than public 
targets (135), and that announcement returns have been found to more be positively related to 
relative size for the acquisition of private targets (Fuller et al. 2002), (Bradley & Sundaram, 
2006). However, the previous research papers that have informed this thesis on the relative 
size effect, describes relationship linearly, while we have used a cubic function. This brings 
additional insight into the relationship between announcement returns and relative size. 
One argument for the initial negative effect of relative size could be that it is harder to 
integrate relatively larger targets into existing operations. The integration costs relative to the 
incremental gains of an acquisition could yield an initial negative relationship between 
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relative size and announcement returns until a certain point where the incremental gain of the 
acquisition outweighs the integration costs. This point, which in our case is at around 25% 
relative value, could be due to a greater synergy potential with larger targets. It seems 
reasonable that there would be a higher synergy potential (e.g. cross-selling opportunities, 
substantial geographical expansion) when the target is beyond a certain size. 
 
The control variable Experience is the number of deals a specific company has done at the 
time, including its latest deal. The experience is calculated using the initial sample extracted 
from the SDC database, which include more deals than the final sample, and includes deals 
announced on the same date by the same company. This ensures that the actual acquisition 
experience is accounted for, even though the deal might not be included in the regression data. 
The coefficient on this variable is significant at the 1% level and negative, but relatively small 
at a predicted average of -0.0319 percentage point abnormal return for each one-deal increase 
in experience. The model has also been fitted with squared terms of experience, but these 
additional terms were not significant. The negative relationship between acquisition frequency 
and bidder announcement returns are not in line with Bradley & Sundaram (2006), but it is in 
line with the negative relationship found in Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999). However, we 
find no significant “U”-shaped relationship using a squared control variable. This might 
indicate that inappropriate generalization, which is the idea that managers erroneously base 
their strategy solely on what has worked in the past, outweighs experience benefits to a 
greater extent for Norwegian markets compared to the U.S. 
 
Using deals conducted in 2014 as the omitted case, deals in 1991 and 1996 produce 
significantly negative abnormal returns, ceteris paribus. The model predicts that abnormal 
returns are 4.77 and 2.74 percentage points lower for deals done in 1991 and 1996, 
respectively. The number of deals included in our data is five and fourteen for the years 1991 
and 1996, which means that these years reflect relatively small parts of the sample, and, it 
should be considered whether these effects do in fact reflect systematic adverse conditions in 
the market for acquisitions in these years, or whether the effects are random. There does not 
seem to be any obvious reason why these particular years should affect abnormal returns 
negatively. 
 
The No control dummy takes the value 1 if an acquirer ended up with a less than 50% stake in 
the target after the deal, or if an acquirer owned more than a 50% stake in the target before the 
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deal. This dummy is meant to reflect the fact the deal did not cause the acquirer to gain 
controlling rights that it did not already have.  The coefficient for this dummy is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. The reason that we find no significant effect of control rights 
could be due to effective control happening at a different levels ownership stake. It is difficult 
to find an exact estimate for what ownership stake gives control because this will most likely 
be different for each company. 
 
Acquirers and targets are considered to be in relating industries based on their SIC-code 
classifications. The more digits in their SIC-codes acquirers and targets have in common, the 
more related their industries. Controlling for industry relatedness uses zero common digits as 
the omitted case. Notably, all degrees of relatedness predict negative abnormal returns, all of 
which are significant, ceteris paribus. The model predicts 1.51, 1.05 or 0.86 percentage points 
negative abnormal returns from having two, three or four common SIC-code digits, 
respectively, compared to the omitted case. The effects are significant at the 1% level for two 
common digits, and at the 5% level for three and four common digits. This in line with the 
results found in Akbulut and Matsusaka (2010), who found that unrelated mergers were less 
negative than related mergers in the U.S and argued that diversification can be a value-
maximising response to deteriorating industry conditions. It is interesting that related mergers 
are less negative the more related they are. This could indicate that there is some form of 
offsetting positive relatedness effect that results in less negative returns for firms that are 
completely related (four common SIC-code digits) than for those that are slightly related 
(two- and three common SIC-code digits). The returns are worst for firms that acquire targets 
that shares their two SIC-code. One could argue that these transactions are “caught in the 
middle” and the acquirer will neither receive a positive effect from diversification, or 
relatedness. 
 
Differences in abnormal returns, owing to the acquirer’s industry, uses services as the omitted 
case. The model predicts significant abnormal returns relating to industry when the acquirer is 
in the “transportation, communications, electric, gas and sanitary” industry. In this case, the 
model predicts an average increase in abnormal return of 1.61 percentage points, significant at 
the 1% level. In addition, the model predicts average negative abnormal returns of 0.91 
percentage points when the target is in this industry, just outside of 10% significance level. 
Note that this result is not a consequence of the acquirer’s industry being the same as that of 
the target, since any abnormal returns owing to industry similarities between acquirer and 
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target are controlled for through different control variables. In the sample for which the model 
is fitted, there are 104 deals where acquirers, and 97 deals where targets, are within this 
industry. This supports the assertion that the observed effect is not random. 
 
Being an acquirer in mining predicts average positive abnormal returns of 1.19 percentage 
points, significant at the 10% level. Furthermore, acquiring targets in mining predicts average 
positive abnormal returns of 1.92 percentage points, significant at the 1% level. There are 94 
deals in the sample where the acquirer is in mining, and 81 deals where the target is in 
mining, solidifying these results. We expect firms in the mining industry to possess assets 
such as gold, aluminium, iron, etc., which are all commodities with more intrinsically stable 
values than assets such as a patent that may or may not prove to have value in the future. 
These assets are relatively easy to value, so one could argue that the risk of overpaying is 
relatively lower. 
 
The model also predicts a large positive effect from being an acquirer in the construction 
industry, at 2.57 percentage points, significant at the 10% level. However, there are only ten 
deals in the sample where the acquirer is in the construction industry, which leads us to doubt 
whether this observed effect is well founded. Similarly, there are only nineteen deals where 
the target is in the construction industry, and the same scepticism applies toward the predicted 
negative value for this effect, even though the effect is also significant at the 10% level. There 
are no other statistically significant effects associated with either acquirer’s or target’s 
industry.  
 
Notably, the coefficient on the day zero dummy is larger when controlling for characteristics 
of deals, while not statistically significant. However, the larger coefficient is simply a result of 
the choices made with regards to the omitted cases for the controls described above. If we 
were to summarize the different coefficients multiplied with the respective average values of 
control variables, we should get the same overall number for abnormal returns as we did in 
the regression without characteristic controls.  
 
Table 13 shows the effects of each control variable weighted by the average value of said 
controls for our sample. The accumulated weighted effect of all controls adds up 1.07 
percentage points positive abnormal returns. This corresponds to the estimated effect on day 
zero from the regression in Table 11 (1.09), with a slight deviation from rounded decimals. 
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Table 13. Weighted average effect – all targets (1/2) 
 
Coefficient Avg. Value Effect 
Day zero 1.1497 1.0000 1.1497 
    Foreign target -0.0605 0.4959 -0.0300 
    All stock offer 3.4694 0.0730 0.2532 
Hybrid offer 0.0730 0.1784 0.0130 
    Cash int. public -0.0589 0.1622 -0.0096 
All stock offer int. public -5.5585 0.0095 -0.0526 
    Hybrid offer int. public -1.4689 0.0108 -0.0159 
    Acquirer size -0.0001 3606.1660 -0.1803 
Acquirer size int. public 0.0000 828.9764 -0.0092 
    Relative value -0.0364 16.1008 -0.5858 
Relative value^2 0.0008 1463.4500 1.1710 
Relative value^3 0.0000 285515.1000 -0.4463 
    Relative value int. public -0.0407 2.7920 -0.1136 
Relative value^2 int. public 0.0009 194.7767 0.1828 
Relative value^3 int. public -0.000004 29051.7264 -0.1263 
    Experience -0.0319 10.6487 -0.3396 
    Year 1988 -1.9029 0.0014 -0.0026 
Year 1989 -1.1102 0.0081 -0.0090 
Year 1990 -0.8015 0.0122 -0.0097 
Year 1991 -4.7732 0.0068 -0.0323 
Year 1992 -1.5832 0.0081 -0.0128 
Year 1993 0.1349 0.0122 0.0016 
Year 1994 -0.7534 0.0189 -0.0143 
Year 1995 -0.5282 0.0230 -0.0121 
Year 1996 -2.7372 0.0189 -0.0518 
Year 1997 0.4827 0.0284 0.0137 
Year 1998 -0.1381 0.0338 -0.0047 
Year 1999 -0.3450 0.0419 -0.0145 
Year 2000 -0.6484 0.0635 -0.0412 
Year 2001 -0.6179 0.0459 -0.0284 
Year 2002 0.5731 0.0324 0.0186 
Year 2003 0.5394 0.0338 0.0182 
Year 2004 0.0202 0.0568 0.0011 
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Table 13. Weighted average effect – all targets (2/2) 
 
Coefficient Avg. Value Effect 
Year 2005 -0.5488 0.0865 -0.0475 
Year 2006 1.2845 0.0811 0.1041 
Year 2007 0.4071 0.1068 0.0435 
Year 2008 2.0375 0.0676 0.1377 
Year 2009 0.7904 0.0324 0.0256 
Year 2010 -0.2526 0.0595 -0.0150 
Year 2011 1.5708 0.0338 0.0531 
Year 2012 2.2023 0.0297 0.0655 
Year 2013 -1.6329 0.0311 -0.0508 
Year 2014 - - - 
    No control -0.4244 0.2243 -0.0952 
    2D common SIC -1.5135 0.1041 -0.1575 
3D common SIC -1.0519 0.1176 -0.1237 
4D common SIC -0.8628 0.3189 -0.2752 
    Agriculture acquirer 1.4944 0.0230 0.0343 
Mining acquirer 1.1990 0.1270 0.1523 
Construction acquirer 2.5691 0.0135 0.0347 
Manufacturing acquirer 0.4692 0.2703 0.1268 
Transportation acquirer 1.6131 0.1405 0.2267 
Wholesale acquirer -0.9964 0.0243 -0.0242 
Retail acquirer 0.8028 0.0095 0.0076 
Finance acquirer 0.2390 0.1243 0.0297 
Services acquirer - - - 
    Agriculture target -0.0118 0.0392 -0.0005 
Mining target 1.9171 0.1095 0.2098 
Construction target -1.6656 0.0257 -0.0428 
Manufacturing target 0.5665 0.2676 0.1516 
Transportation target -0.9139 0.1311 -0.1198 
Wholesale target -0.0098 0.0378 -0.0004 
Retail target -1.0169 0.0176 -0.0179 
Finance target -0.5013 0.0838 -0.0420 
Services target - - - 
    Weighted average effect 
  
1.0714 
Note: "int" denotes interaction   
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As discussed, the next natural step is to divide the sample into two groups, public targets and 
private targets, and fit the model for each group, separately. 
7.3 Controlling for the characteristics of the M&A event with private targets 
The regression shown in table 14 now only includes deals where the acquisition target is a 
private company. This yields a sample of 605 deals. 
 
Since the new sample contains a large proportion of the same deals used in the regression for 
all deals (table 12), the regressions results are obviously quite similar. The controls that have 
statistically significant coefficients are the same as before, with quite similar significance 
levels and sizes, with only a few exceptions.  
 
The coefficients on the dummies for years 2008 and 2012 are now significant at the 5% level. 
Making an acquisition 2008 or 2012 is predicted to result in positive abnormal returns of 2.30 
and 2.66 percentage points, respectively, ceteris paribus. The sample contains 41 deals that 
were announced in 2008 and the target was private, making the observed effect for this year 
quite robust. Further, the sample contains only 16 deals from 2012 involving private targets, 
which is to say that the observed effect from this year might be less well founded.  
 
A seemingly likely explanation for the observed effects of 2008 and 2012 is the fact that these 
were both times of serious economic recessions. The year 2008 saw the recession triggered by 
the American housing bubble and the fall of Lehman Brothers; and 2012 witnessed the 
European “credit crunch” with several European states unable to fulfil their economic 
commitments. During these economic downturns, it might have been that companies under 
financial duress were acquired by financially sound firms at a low valuation relative to 
valuations in more stable times. This is sometimes referred to as a “fire sale”, implying that 
firms have no choice but to sell, increasing supply, and lowering prices. 
 
The effect of relatedness in the form of three common SIC-code digits is now slightly less 
negative, with a predicted negative abnormal return of 0.83 percentage points (compared to 
negative 1.05 percentage points for all deals). Interestingly, the estimated effect is no longer 
significant, with a t-value of 1.52. There is no obvious reason why the significance of this 
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effect should change so drastically while the significance of other degrees of relatedness stay 
approximately the same, simply as a result of excluding public targets from the analysis. 
 
The predicted effect from being a transportation, communications, electric, gas and sanitary 
industry acquirer is now larger, at 1.97 percentage points abnormal return (compared to 
1.61% percentage points when looking at all deals). In addition, acquiring targets in the same 
industry predicts slightly more negative returns than before, at 1.14 percentage points 
negative abnormal return (compared to 0.91 percentage points before), and now significant at 
the 10% level. There are 86 deals with acquirers, and 77 deals with targets within this 
industry, which means that we can be still be confident in these results. 
 
Finally, being a mining industry acquirer is predicted to be slightly more beneficial when only 
analysing private targets. The effect of being an acquirer in mining is predicted to cause 1.97 
percentage points positive abnormal returns (compared to 1.61 percentage points from the full 
sample of private and public targets). Similarly, the model predicts that acquiring private 
targets in the mining industry causes positive abnormal returns of 2.42 percentage points 
(compared to an average effect of 1.92 percentage points when looking at both private and 
public mining targets). There are 69 deals with acquirers, and 58 deals with targets in the 
mining industry, supporting the validity of these results. 
 
Table 15 shows the weighted average effects for the regression that only includes private 
targets. The estimated overall effect on abnormal returns is now 1.24 percentage points 
(compared to 1.07 for all deals). Notably, using stock as payment method drives the average 
abnormal returns positively to a large degree. Acquirers in the transportation, 
communications, electric, gas and sanitary industry, as well as well as mining targets, also 
heavily drive the abnormal returns positively. In addition, effects from all degrees of industry 
relatedness drives average abnormal returns for the sample in a noticeably negative direction. 
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Table 14. Regression output – private targets (1/2) 
 
Coef. Std. err. t-stat p-value 
Day zero 1.1972 1.093 1.10 0.273 
     Foreign target -0.2806 0.324 -0.87 0.387 
     All stock offer 3.4115*** 0.622 5.48 0.000 
Hybrid offer -0.0037 0.407 -0.01 0.993 
     Acquirer size -0.0001** 0.000 -2.92 0.004 
Relative value -0.0401* 0.016 -2.49 0.013 
Relative value^2 0.0008*** 0.000 5.84 0.000 
Relative value^3 -0.0000*** 0.000 -6.10 0.000 
     Experience -0.0329* 0.015 -2.17 0.030 
     Year 1988 -2.2333 3.754 -0.59 0.552 
Year 1989 -0.0960 3.776 -0.03 0.980 
Year 1990 -1.1622 1.621 -0.72 0.473 
Year 1991 -10.6287*** 2.841 -3.74 0.000 
Year 1992 -1.6989 1.783 -0.95 0.341 
Year 1993 -2.7416 1.878 -1.46 0.144 
Year 1994 0.0050 1.541 0.00 0.997 
Year 1995 -0.5597 1.428 -0.39 0.695 
Year 1996 -4.2873** 1.567 -2.74 0.006 
Year 1997 0.3420 1.280 0.27 0.789 
Year 1998 -0.1599 1.228 -0.13 0.896 
Year 1999 -0.1593 1.236 -0.13 0.897 
Year 2000 -0.5151 1.104 -0.47 0.641 
Year 2001 -1.0252 1.180 -0.87 0.385 
Year 2002 0.6511 1.222 0.53 0.594 
Year 2003 0.7799 1.202 0.65 0.516 
Year 2004 -0.0485 1.114 -0.04 0.965 
Year 2005 -0.5797 1.065 -0.54 0.586 
Year 2006 1.4767 1.077 1.37 0.170 
Year 2007 0.3939 1.043 0.38 0.706 
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Table 14. Regression output – private targets (2/2) 
 
Coef. Std. err. t-stat p-value 
Year 2008 2.3009* 1.095 2.10 0.036 
Year 2009 0.5846 1.298 0.45 0.653 
Year 2010 0.2707 1.126 0.24 0.810 
Year 2011 1.6744 1.223 1.37 0.171 
Year 2012 2.6570* 1.328 2.00 0.045 
Year 2013 -1.7805 1.274 -1.40 0.162 
Year 2014 0.0000 . . . 
     No control -0.8539 0.466 -1.83 0.067 
     2D common SIC -1.5816** 0.539 -2.93 0.003 
3D common SIC -0.8279 0.546 -1.52 0.129 
4D common SIC -0.8523* 0.384 -2.22 0.027 
     Agriculture acquirer 1.9703 1.401 1.41 0.160 
Mining acquirer 1.4145 0.773 1.83 0.067 
Construction acquirer 3.1107 1.714 1.81 0.070 
Manufacturing acquirer 0.6941 0.555 1.25 0.211 
Transportation acquirer 1.9654** 0.656 3.00 0.003 
Wholesale acquirer -1.3820 1.178 -1.17 0.241 
Retail acquirer 0.5487 1.905 0.29 0.773 
Finance acquirer -0.1238 0.707 -0.17 0.861 
Services acquirer 0.0000 . . . 
     Agriculture target -0.0359 1.151 -0.03 0.975 
Mining target 2.4235** 0.781 3.10 0.002 
Construction target -2.0145 1.081 -1.86 0.062 
Manufacturing target 0.8472 0.554 1.53 0.126 
Transportation target -1.1435 0.665 -1.72 0.085 
Wholesale target -0.0255 0.881 -0.03 0.977 
Retail target -0.5353 1.478 -0.36 0.717 
Finance target -0.8047 0.764 -1.05 0.292 
Services target 0.0000 . . . 
     _cons 0.0367*** 0.005 7.97 0.000 
N 615748.0000 
   r2_w 0.0828 
   r2_b 0.1302 
   r2_o 0.0828 
   * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 15. Weighted average effect – private targets (1/2) 
 
Coefficient Avg. Value Effect 
Day zero 1.1972 1.0000 1.1972 
    Foreign target -0.2806 0.5306 -0.1489 
    All stock offer 3.4115 0.0777 0.2650 
Hybrid offer -0.0037 0.2050 -0.0007 
    Acquirer size -0.0001 3397 -0.1866 
    Relative value -0.0401 16 -0.6530 
Relative value^2 0.0008 1552 1.3040 
Relative value^3 0.0000 313691 -0.5129 
    Experience -0.0329 10.1521 -0.3344 
    Year 1988 -2.2333 0.0017 -0.0037 
Year 1989 -0.0960 0.0017 -0.0002 
Year 1990 -1.1622 0.0132 -0.0154 
Year 1991 -10.6287 0.0033 -0.0351 
Year 1992 -1.6989 0.0099 -0.0168 
Year 1993 -2.7416 0.0099 -0.0272 
Year 1994 0.0050 0.0165 0.0001 
Year 1995 -0.5597 0.0215 -0.0120 
Year 1996 -4.2873 0.0149 -0.0638 
Year 1997 0.3420 0.0314 0.0107 
Year 1998 -0.1599 0.0364 -0.0058 
Year 1999 -0.1593 0.0364 -0.0058 
Year 2000 -0.5151 0.0678 -0.0349 
Year 2001 -1.0252 0.0612 -0.0627 
Year 2002 0.6511 0.0380 0.0248 
Year 2003 0.7799 0.0380 0.0296 
Year 2004 -0.0485 0.0661 -0.0032 
Year 2005 -0.5797 0.0909 -0.0527 
Year 2006 1.4767 0.0760 0.1123 
Year 2007 0.3939 0.1058 0.0417 
Year 2008 2.3009 0.0678 0.1559 
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Table 15. Weighted average effect – private targets (2/2) 
 
Coefficient Avg. Value Effect 
Year 2009 0.5846 0.0281 0.0164 
Year 2010 0.2707 0.0579 0.0157 
Year 2011 1.6744 0.0364 0.0609 
Year 2012 2.6570 0.0264 0.0703 
Year 2013 -1.7805 0.0314 -0.0559 
Year 2014 
   
    No control -0.8539 0.1388 -0.1186 
    2D common SIC -1.5816 0.1140 -0.1804 
3D common SIC -0.8279 0.1256 -0.1040 
4D common SIC -0.8523 0.3207 -0.2733 
    Agriculture acquirer 1.9703 0.0215 0.0423 
Mining acquirer 1.4145 0.1140 0.1613 
Construction acquirer 3.1107 0.0116 0.0360 
Manufacturing acquirer 0.6941 0.2694 0.1870 
Transportation acquirer 1.9654 0.1421 0.2794 
Wholesale acquirer -1.3820 0.0198 -0.0274 
Retail acquirer 0.5487 0.0116 0.0063 
Finance acquirer -0.1238 0.0926 -0.0115 
Services acquirer 
   
    Agriculture target -0.0359 0.0347 -0.0012 
Mining target 2.4235 0.0959 0.2323 
Construction target -2.0145 0.0298 -0.0599 
Manufacturing target 0.8472 0.2545 0.2157 
Transportation target -1.1435 0.1273 -0.1455 
Wholesale target -0.0255 0.0380 -0.0010 
Retail target -0.5353 0.0215 -0.0115 
Finance target -0.8047 0.0744 -0.0599 
Services target 
   
    Weighted average effect 
  
1.2391 
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7.4 Controlling for the characteristics of the M&A event with public targets 
The regression shown in table 16 now include only deals where the acquisition target is a 
public company. This yields a sample of 135 deals. 
 
Interestingly, when fitting the model only for deals that involved a publicly traded target 
company, none of the coefficients on control variables are statistically significant, not even at 
the 10% level. The coefficient on the day zero announcement dummy is not close to being 
significant, which implies that there are no abnormal returns the model is failing to explain. 
Based on these results, the natural conclusion to be drawn is that there are no abnormal 
returns to Norwegian acquirers when acquiring a publicly traded company.  
 
This is consistent with efficient markets for corporate control, as competition in such a market 
will not allow any firm to acquire another firm at a price which will give them abnormal 
returns. Therefore, the expected announcement returns in such a market should be 
indistinguishable from zero (Travlos (1987). 
 
Table 17 show the weighted average effects on abnormal returns for the regression that only 
include public targets. The estimated overall effect on abnormal returns is now a modest 0.19 
percentage points (compared to 1.07% for all targets). This coincides with the assertion that 
abnormal returns from acquisitions of public targets are indistinguishable from zero. To 
further investigate this result, we also performed a regression with public targets only and 
without other controls than dummies for days surrounding day zero. This regression (not 
shown) reveals no significant abnormal returns for any day around acquisitions of public 
targets, supporting the assertion that abnormal returns from acquiring public targets does not 
produce abnormal returns. 
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Table 16. Regression output – Public targets (1/2) 
 
Coef. Std. err. t-stat p-value 
Day zero 0.6828 4.311 0.16 0.874 
     Foreign target 0.6377 0.871 0.73 0.464 
     All stock offer -1.0062 2.107 -0.48 0.633 
Hybrid offer 1.2233 2.107 0.58 0.561 
     Acquirer size -0.0001 0.000 -0.95 0.342 
Relative value -0.0168 0.083 -0.20 0.839 
Relative value^2 0.0007 0.001 0.51 0.612 
Relative value^3 -0.0000 0.000 -0.60 0.551 
     Experience 0.0101 0.046 0.22 0.825 
     Year 1988 0.0000 . . . 
Year 1989 -1.1637 4.238 -0.27 0.784 
Year 1990 0.0000 . . . 
Year 1991 -1.0931 4.610 -0.24 0.813 
Year 1992 0.0000 . . . 
Year 1993 5.1844 4.354 1.19 0.234 
Year 1994 -2.2724 4.282 -0.53 0.596 
Year 1995 -0.6757 4.370 -0.15 0.877 
Year 1996 0.3877 4.220 0.09 0.927 
Year 1997 2.7479 4.594 0.60 0.550 
Year 1998 0.2554 4.683 0.05 0.957 
Year 1999 -0.5606 3.992 -0.14 0.888 
Year 2000 0.2562 4.296 0.06 0.952 
Year 2001 0.7796 4.118 0.19 0.850 
Year 2002 0.5069 5.667 0.09 0.929 
Year 2003 -3.0898 5.237 -0.59 0.555 
Year 2004 1.0567 4.735 0.22 0.823 
Year 2005 -0.3619 4.115 -0.09 0.930 
Year 2006 0.8802 4.075 0.22 0.829 
Year 2007 0.8403 4.020 0.21 0.834 
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Table 16. Regression output – Public targets (2/2) 
 
Coef. Std. err. t-stat p-value 
Year 2008 0.1536 4.066 0.04 0.970 
Year 2009 0.8544 4.195 0.20 0.839 
Year 2010 -0.8768 4.100 -0.21 0.831 
Year 2011 -0.2444 4.619 -0.05 0.958 
Year 2012 0.7143 4.340 0.16 0.869 
Year 2013 -0.4808 4.487 -0.11 0.915 
Year 2014 0.0000 . . . 
     No control 1.1143 0.887 1.26 0.209 
     2D common SIC -0.5027 1.999 -0.25 0.801 
3D common SIC -2.3318 1.794 -1.30 0.194 
4D common SIC -1.0859 1.017 -1.07 0.286 
     Agriculture acquirer -1.8125 3.232 -0.56 0.575 
Mining acquirer -0.7226 2.638 -0.27 0.784 
Construction acquirer 0.4453 3.506 0.13 0.899 
Manufacturing acquirer -2.7056 2.186 -1.24 0.216 
Transportation acquirer 0.2450 2.488 0.10 0.922 
Wholesale acquirer -2.7762 2.800 -0.99 0.321 
Retail acquirer 0.0000 . . . 
Finance acquirer -1.2013 2.271 -0.53 0.597 
Services acquirer 0.0000 . . . 
Agriculture target 0.5454 2.192 0.25 0.804 
     Mining target 1.8126 2.210 0.82 0.412 
Construction target -0.2887 5.010 -0.06 0.954 
Manufacturing target -0.1270 1.442 -0.09 0.930 
Transportation target -0.0515 1.862 -0.03 0.978 
Wholesale target -1.5629 2.565 -0.61 0.542 
Retail target 0.0000 . . . 
Finance target 0.6704 1.961 0.34 0.732 
Services target 0.0000 . . . 
     _cons 0.0366*** 0.005 7.96 0.000 
     N 615278.0000 
  r2_w 0.0821 
   r2_b 0.1369 
   r2_o 0.0821 
   * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 17. Weighted average effect – public targets (1/2) 
 
Coefficient Avg. Value Effect 
Day zero 0.6828 1.0000 0.6828 
    Foreign target 0.6377 0.3407 0.2173 
    All stock offer -1.0062 0.0519 -0.0522 
Hybrid offer 1.2233 0.0593 0.0725 
    Acquirer size -0.0001 4544 -0.2327 
    Relative value -0.0168 15 -0.2569 
Relative value^2 0.0007 1068 0.7564 
Relative value^3 -0.0000026 159247 -0.4179 
    Experience 0.0101 12.8741 0.1295 
    Year 1988 - - - 
Year 1989 -1.1637 0.0370 -0.0431 
Year 1990 - - - 
Year 1991 -1.0931 0.0222 -0.0243 
Year 1992 - - - 
Year 1993 5.1844 0.0222 0.1152 
Year 1994 -2.2724 0.0296 -0.0673 
Year 1995 -0.6757 0.0296 -0.0200 
Year 1996 0.3877 0.0370 0.0144 
Year 1997 2.7479 0.0148 0.0407 
Year 1998 0.2554 0.0222 0.0057 
Year 1999 -0.5606 0.0667 -0.0374 
Year 2000 0.2562 0.0593 0.0152 
Year 2001 0.7796 0.0519 0.0404 
Year 2002 0.5069 0.0074 0.0038 
Year 2003 -3.0898 0.0148 -0.0458 
Year 2004 1.0567 0.0148 0.0157 
Year 2005 -0.3619 0.0667 -0.0241 
Year 2006 0.8802 0.1037 0.0913 
Year 2007 0.8403 0.1111 0.0934 
Year 2008 0.1536 0.0667 0.0102 
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Table 17. Weighted average effect – public targets (2/2) 
 
Coefficient Avg. Value Effect 
Year 2009 0.8544 0.0519 0,0443 
Year 2010 -0.8768 0.0667 -0,0585 
Year 2011 -0.2444 0.0222 -0,0054 
Year 2012 0.7143 0.0444 0,0317 
Year 2013 -0.4808 0.0296 -0,0142 
Year 2014 - - - 
    No control 1.1143 0.6074 0,6768 
    2D common SIC -0.5027 0.0593 -0,0298 
3D common SIC -2.3318 0.0815 -0,1900 
4D common SIC -1.0859 0.3111 -0,3378 
    Agriculture acquirer -1.8125 0.0296 -0,0537 
Mining acquirer -0.7226 0.1852 -0,1338 
Construction acquirer 0.4453 0.0222 0,0099 
Manufacturing acquirer -2.7056 0.2741 -0,7415 
Transportation acquirer 0.2450 0.1333 0,0327 
Wholesale acquirer -2.7762 0.0444 -0,1234 
Retail acquirer - - - 
Finance acquirer -1.2013 0.2667 -0,3203 
Services acquirer - - - 
    Agriculture target 0.5454 0.0593 0,0323 
Mining target 1.8126 0.1704 0,3088 
Construction target -0.2887 0.0074 -0,0021 
Manufacturing target -0.1270 0.3259 -0,0414 
Transportation target -0.0515 0.1481 -0,0076 
Wholesale target -1.5629 0.0370 -0,0579 
Retail target - - - 
Finance target 0.6704 0.1259 0,0844 
Services target - - - 
    Weighted average effect 
 
0.1862 
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7.5 Summary of empirical results 
We have analysed the nature of the event window around M&A announcements with 
Norwegian acquirers; and we have modelled abnormal returns to acquirers from a sample of  
740 deals with information that allow us to control for various factors, distinguishing between 
private and public targets. 
 
Controlling for 20 trading days before and after announcement reveals that the only day when 
abnormal returns from M&A announcements are statistically significant is on the actual 
announcement day. Consequently, further analysis of abnormal returns were conducted only 
with respect to day zero. As far as we know, this is the first study to show this. 
 
We further show that abnormal returns can be explained by differences in the consideration 
offered to the owners of targets, specifically that there is a positive effect from offering stock 
to private targets, and a negative effect from offering stock to public targets. Moreover, 
acquirers obtain lower abnormal returns when their absolute size is larger. Also, relative size 
between the deal value and the acquirer negatively affects abnormal returns when relative size 
is lower than approximately 50%, while relative value above this threshold affects abnormal 
returns positively. Abnormal returns are also negatively affected when a company has more 
acquisition experience (i.e. the company has done more deals in the past). We also show that 
deals done in 2008 and 2012 result in increased abnormal returns compared to other years. 
Acquiring targets which are in related industries affect abnormal returns negatively, compared 
to diversifying acquisitions. Finally, abnormal returns are higher when the acquiring company 
is in the mining and transportation, communications, electric, gas and sanitary industries; 
abnormal returns are higher when the target is in the mining industry, and lower when the 
target is in transportation, communications, electric, gas and sanitary industries 
 
Modelling abnormal returns for deals where targets were private yields very similar results as 
those described in the above paragraph. Notable differences include: increased positive effects 
from deals done in 2008 and 2012; less negative returns from acquisitions of companies 
related through three digit common SIC-codes; and increased sizes in abnormal returns (both 
positive and negative) when acquirers or targets belong to the industries described in the 
above paragraph. 
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Modelling abnormal returns for deals where targets were publicly traded yields very different 
results than those described above. In fact, no coefficients in the estimated model are 
statistically significant. This leads to the conclusion that abnormal returns from deals, where 
the acquisition target is a publicly traded company, are, on average, indistinguishable from 
zero. 
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8. Robustness issues 
As mentioned before, we employ a random effects model in order to estimate our results. To 
test whether this is in fact correct, we also ran regressions specified as fixed effects models, 
and subsequently performed Hausman specification tests to see whether the underlying 
assumptions of random effects estimation are met. We were not able to reject the null-
hypothesis that there are no systematic differences in coefficients, which mean that we choose 
to continue using the random effects model, which is also more efficient, provided underlying 
assumptions are met. 
 
The validity of statistical inference through t-tests rely on assumptions of approximately 
normally distributed error terms. It is the case with financial data that distribution of returns 
are almost always peaked near zero with fat tails at either end. The plot below shows the 
distribution of predicted errors from our regression including all deals and all characteristic 
controls. In principle, fat tail causes the problem that conventional limits for test statistics are 
no longer valid. However, we did not encounter any reference to this issue in published 
research on abnormal returns, which implies that researchers do not consider this issue 
crucial. As such, we do not address this issue in our analysis. 
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An issue when conducting analysis on a part of a sample is the risk of sample selection bias. 
The SDC database keep extensive records of M&A transactions that have taken place, and is 
widely used in published research. Therefore, we feel confident that the initial sample 
represents, at minimum, the large majority of deals conducted by Norwegian publicly traded 
acquirers. Still, the analysis we performed was, by necessity, only for a part of this sample. 
However, as shown in the section describing the sample, the characteristics of the deals we 
had to leave out of the analysis matches our kept sample, for the most part, quite closely. As 
such we do not expect that the estimated results are materially affected by sample selection 
bias.  
 
Finally, it is always necessary to consider if the model is likely to suffer from endogeneity 
bias. One could imagine development in share price would affect control variables in our 
model. For instance, an acquirer could be more likely to offer stock as payment method after a 
recent surge in share prices. However, it does not seem reasonable that daily stock returns 
should affect control variables included in our model. This line of reasoning is further 
supported by our results, which show that there are no significant correlations between daily 
returns prior to an M&A announcement. As such, we are comfortable in the assertion that the 
model does not suffer from endogeneity. 
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9. Conclusion 
This thesis examines the announcement returns for Norwegian acquirers of foreign and 
domestic targets. We find results consistent with the view that the public market for corporate 
control is efficient, as we find no significant abnormal returns for companies that acquire 
public targets. However, we find significant abnormal returns for companies that acquire 
private targets. This confirms hypothesis I and II. 
 
Furthermore, testing a 41-day window around acquisition announcement reveals that the only 
day that yields significant abnormal returns is day zero (the announcement date). This is 
consistent with the efficient market hypothesis in semi-strong form, which says that the 
market reflects all publicly known information. As far as we know, we are the first to show 
this.  
 
We also find consistency with many of the documented effects that exist for U.S. acquirers. 
This includes a negative relationship between the acquirer’s absolute size and announcement 
returns; that acquiring public targets with stock is more negative than with cash and that the 
opposite is true for acquiring private targets; and that unrelated acquisitions have more 
positive announcement returns than related acquisitions. This confirms hypothesis III, IV, V, 
and VI.  
 
Certain acquiring and target industries display abnormal returns, contrary to hypothesis VII 
and VIII. In addition, we can neither conclude that Norwegian acquirers receive greater 
returns from domestic acquisitions nor that a controlling ownership stake yields greater 
returns, which reject hypothesis IX and X. 
 
Furthermore, we bring additional insight to the effect of the relative size of the target on 
bidder announcement returns using a cubic relationship that reveals a negative relationship up 
to the point where the target is one fourth of the acquirer’s size and a positive relationship 
beyond this point. This relationship means that we cannot conclude either way with regards to 
hypothesis XI. 
 
We use a random effects model on panel data to conduct our analysis, which allows us to 
control for numerous firm- and deal specific variables simultaneously. This makes it more 
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informative than the traditional event study method, which stratify their sample in order to test 
for the effect of each variable. As far as we know, we are the first to apply this approach for 
analysing bidder returns. Additionally, we are, to our knowledge, the first to account for the 
possibility of altered marked beta coefficients as a result of acquisitions, through the use of a 
step-beta approach.  
 
Finally, we suggest two main topics for further research. First, it would be interesting to 
conduct research on the announcement returns for domestic acquirers in each country the 
Norwegian firms in our sample have done M&A and compare their returns to the returns in 
our sample. This could potentially clarify whether the effect truly is insignificant, or whether 
there are two opposing effects (e.g. geographical proximity vs. higher returns in foreign 
markets) that cancel each other out. Second, it would be interesting to conduct further 
research on the relative size effect in the U.S. using a cubic relationship to see whether the 
cubic effect on relative size is similar to what we find for Norwegian acquirers. 
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